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MARKETS, MYTHS, AND A MAN ON THE MOON: AIDING AND
ABETTING AMERICA'S FLIGHT FROM HEALTH INSURANCE
Andr6 Hampton*
"Giving money and power to the government is like giving whiskey
and car keys to teenage boys."
-P.J. O'Rourke'
Television Announcer: "Things are changing, and not all for the better.
The government may force us to pick from a few health care plans de-
signed by government bureaucrats."
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1. P.J. O'ROuRKE, PARLIAMENT OF WHORES xvii (1991), quoted in Jeffrey Prescott,
Book Note, Government Efficiency and the Market Metaphor, 105 YALE L.J. 2019, 2019
n.1 (1996) (reviewing DONALD WITMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE (1995)).
2. David Ewing Duncan, The Triumph of Harry & Louise: How the Mighty Insur-
ance Lobby Skunked Clinton and Demolished His Health Care Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1994, at 28. Harry and Louise were central characters in the Health Insurance As-
sociation of America's ad campaign against the Clinton health care reform proposal.
See Haynes Johnson & David S. Broder, Health Care Reform Was High Stakes Lobby-
ing Battle, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, May 19, 1996, at 1. A forty-something,
married professional couple, they discussed various features of the Clinton reform plan
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"They can put a man on the moon, [but they] can't make a coffee
without caffeine [that tastes good?]"
-Disgruntled Coffee Drinker, circa 1970.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The presumption that the government is wasteful and inefficient
is central to the American credo." Adherence to this belief yields a
distinctly American mythology-the Mythology of the Market ("the
Mythology"). According to the Mythology, markets are better for allo-
cating resources than the government.' We cannot trust the govern-
ment with too much power to allocate resources because the govern-
ment-being inherently inefficient-will squander resources. The
Mythology is partly responsible for the lack of universal health cov-
erage in the United States.'
with alarm. See Duncan, supra, at 28. Harry and Louise are given credit for creating
opposition to the Clinton health care reform plan and its ultimate demise. See id.; see
also Johnson & Broder, supra.
3. Kyle Larson, In "Fence," Bigotry Invades Boys' World, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
Jan. 18, 1998, at G6 (discussing a playwright's recollection of a 1970s coffee commer-
cial which ran after Neil Armstrong's moon walk); see also Like Man on Moon, Sta-
dium is Great Rhetoric, Letter to the Editor, THE CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 27, 1998, at
22A. Following the National Aeronautic & Space Administration's (NASA) successful
mission of placing a man on the moon in 1970, the expression "[t]hey can put a man on
the moon" has entered into the popular lexicon as an expression of frustration over
mankind's inability to overcome seemingly easy problems. For example, "[t]hey can
put a man on the moon but they can't make an army boot that keeps your toes warm
in the wintertime." Id. For our purposes, it is important to note that NASA is a gov-
ernment agency.
4. See William V. Roth, Jr., The "Malmanagement" Problem: Finding the Roots of
Government Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961, 961 (1983). Ac-
cording to Roth:
One explanation for the apparently deep-seated public distrust of govern-
ment is found in the widespread impression that government is, by and
large, ineffective in solving the nation's problems, inefficient in carrying out
its assigned functions, wasteful of the taxpayers' dollars, and highly subject
to fraudulent practices by those who work for the government and those who
benefit from its programs.
Id.
5. See infra note 6 and accompanying text for discussion of Americans' distrust of
government.
6. See John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The American Health Care System,
326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 962, 963 (1992) (noting failed attempts to enact universal
health coverage dating as far back as the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt due to
'Americans' distrust of government, the heterogeneity of their values, and the absence
of a sense of noblesse oblige") (citing Victor Fuchs, National Health Insurance Revis-
ited, 10 HEALTH AFF. 7-17 (1991)); see also Robert J. Blendon et al., The American Pub-
lic and the Critical Choices for Health System Reform, 271 JAMA 1539, 1543 (1994)
(noting forty-year low in percentage (19%) of individuals expressing trust in the fed-
eral government). In addition, 51% of the respondents believed the private insurance
988 [Vol. 52:987
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The American health care scene is nothing less than a night-
mare. During 1998, 44.3 million U.S. citizens, over sixteen percent of
the population, were not protected by any form of health coverage.7
Persons who currently have health coverage are constantly in fear of
losing their coverage, being denied coverage for services they and
their physician believe are medically necessary, or being toyed with
by some profit-maximizing HMO.8 This health care nightmare dem-
onstrates that the provision of health coverage through the market is
"Bad Business." Bad Business is the term I use to describe the inap-
propriate assignment to the market of an activity which should be
reserved to the government. No matter how fervently Americans de-
sire to cling to the Mythology, the reality can not sustain the Mythol-
ogy's alluring promise as it relates to health coverage.
When a society leaves health coverage to the market, that society
inevitably comes up short. This is because the market does not ac-
count for the existence of externalities in the allocation of health cov-
erage. An externality is a benefit or a cost that a private actor does
not need to take into account when consuming or producing a good or
industry would better manage the health care system, versus 32% who believed gov-
ernment would better manage the system. Id.
7. Jennifer A. Campbell, Current Population Reports: Health Insurance Coverage,
U. S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 1999); see also Anne Dievler & Terence Giovannini, Com-
munity Health Centers: Promise & Performance, 55 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 405, 406
(1998) (citing Employee Benefit Research Institute for the fact that "[i]n 1997 there
were 41 million uninsured individuals in the United States"); Amy Goldstein & Terry
Neal, On the Road, Away from Crisis: Clinton's Pitch on Health Care Reflects Lessons
Learned in '94, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1998, at Al (noting an estimated forty-one mil-
lion Americans are uninsured); Gerl Aston, GOP Goal: Affordable Insurance, AM. MED.
NEWS, July 13, 1998 (same); available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-
pubs/amenews/pick_.98/pick0713.htm.
8. See Congressional Roundup: Clinton Calls for Patients' Rights Bill: Public
Anxiety About Health Care Grows, 7 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1499 (Sept. 24, 1998) (de-
scribing results of survey released by The Henry J. Kaiser Foundation and Harvard
University which indicated that 36% of persons believed that "managed care plans do
a bad job serving consumers while 30% said they do a good job"). In the Kaiser Foun-
dation survey, 57% of those surveyed indicated they had trouble with their health
plan. Id; see also Blendon et al., supra note 6, at 1540 (noting that "[t]wo-thirds of
Americans still worry that their future health costs will not be adequately covered by
insurance" and that 43% "worry a lot about not having enough health insurance to pay
for good medical care"). HMOs' penchants for profit maximization have become part of
the public perception, as reflected in the following exchange between Carol the Wait-
ress (played by Helen Hunt) and a physician in the 1997 movie "As Good As It Gets."
Carol: "They said my plan didn't cover it and it wasn't necessary anyway.... [Bleep-
ing] HMOs. "Bastard pieces of [bleep] .... I'm sorry."
Dr. Battes: "It's OK. Actually, I think that's their technical name."
George Skelton, California and the West: Who Remembers What the "M" in HMO
Means?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at 3. This exchange was cheered by movie audi-
ences all over the country. See id.
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a service Externalities are social costs which are imposed on or so-
cial benefits enjoyed by others. The failure to address externalities
results in a sub-optimal production or consumption of a good or ser-
vice." In the United States, adherence to the Mythology has resulted
in an inadequate approach to the problems of externalities in health
coverage. This has led to the current sub-optimal level of health cov-
erage.
The problem with externalities in health coverage is two-fold.
First, the status of being protected against out of pocket health ex-
penditures has social benefits. These benefits are not taken into ac-
count when individuals make decisions about obtaining health cover-
age. Without governmental intervention, the result is a sub-optimal
consumption of health coverage. 2 Second, negative externalities arise
from the actions of private insurers who are attempting to respond to
problems inherent in the insurance model of health coverage. Private
insurers operate pursuant to rational insurance principles." Unfor-
tunately, when applied to insuring against expenditures for health
care, these rational insurance principles invite and even require ex-
clusionary practices and fragmentation of risk pools. 4 Such exclu-
sionary practices and fragmentation of risk pools produce negative
externalities in the form of higher costs for health coverage and
shortages in, or even the absence of, health coverage."
Without comprehensive governmental intervention, the market
exacerbates the problem of externalities. 6 This is the essence of Bad
Business. The appropriate governmental response to the existence of
externalities would be to provide subsidies to induce consumption or
production of goods with positive externalities and to prohibit or pe-
nalize activity which produces negative externalities. The United
States has undertaken a rather tepid approach to the problems of ex-
ternalities in the health care coverage system. Instead of providing
sufficient direct subsidies we have relied on indirect subsidies. We
9. Infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text for discussion of externalities.
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of social benefits
resulting from adequate health coverage.
12. See infra notes 56-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of effect of
externalities on optimal level of health coverage.
13. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of insurance prin-
ciples.
14. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of impact of in-
surance principles on health coverage market.
15. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of externalities
resulting from operation of insurance market.
16. See discussion infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
results of combining insurance principles in the market as a means to provide health
coverage.
[Vol. 52:987
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have also not systematically intervened in the health care coverage
market to prevent the exploitation of externalities arising from in-
surance practices. Limited and indirect governmental intervention in
the health coverage market is consonant with the Mythology. The
Mythology's credo is clear: "The best is government which governs
least."17
Such limited and indirect governmental attempts to intervene in
the health coverage market have further aggravated the problem of
externalities by aiding and abetting a flight from health insurance
risk by the private health insurance industry. This flight is reflected
in the movement towards self-funded health benefit programs by
employers and risk sharing arrangements with health care providers.
Under self-funded benefit programs, employers assume the first dol-
lar risk of their employees' health expenditure." Risk sharing is an
arrangement by which insurers contract with health care providers
for the health care providers to assume some of the financial risk for
the health care expenses resulting from their treatment of patients. 9
Each of these phenomena allow the private insurance industry to ex-
port some of its risks to other actors in the health care system.
Self-funding arrangements and risk-sharing arrangements are
symptomatic of the underlying problems associated with relying on
the market to allocate health coverage in light of the fragility of the
insurance model. Efforts to curtail exploitation of externalities invite
resistance, which may be reflected in decreases in or elimination of
health coverage. Given its limited role in health coverage, the gov-
ernment is forced to find substitutes for direct subsidies and regula-
tion. Allowing self-funding arrangements and risk sharing provides a
substitute (albeit, an arguably poor one) for explicit governmental
subsidization of health coverage and strict regulation of the health
coverage market. Not surprisingly then, these phenomena are absent
in countries which have adopted universal health coverage." These
governments can resort to more explicit means to produce adequate
health coverage and to control costs.2'
17. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 502 (5th ed. 1999) (quoting John L.
O'Sullivan); see also Robert W. McGee, Some Tax Advice for Latvia and Other Similar
Emerging Economies, 13 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 223, 226 (1996) ("This author begins with
the premise that the best government is one that governs least, a position consistent
with the view that the private sector can do just about anything more efficiently than
the government.").
18. See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of self insurance
by employers.
19. See infra notes 117-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of risk sharing
arrangements.
20. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of absence of
risk sharing and self insurance in OECD countries.
21. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of cost contain-
2000]
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Adherence to Bad Business leaves the United States as the only
developed country without universal health coverage. All Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation (OECD) countries (and even most de-
veloping countries) have established systems to ensure that nearly
one hundred percent of their population is covered for at least a basic
minimum level of health benefits 22 These countries achieve universal
coverage through a variety of financing mechanisms. However, all
such governments have abandoned either: (1) reliance on the market
to allocate health coverage; (2) reliance on the insurance model for
the provision of health coverage or (3) both.23 In essence they have es-
chewed Bad Business.
The managed care industry has created the temporary illusion
that we can have access to adequate and affordable health coverage
through operation of the insurance model in the free market. How-
ever, the rising public dissatisfaction with managed care24 indicates
that this illusion is being sorely tested. We are beginning to witness
an increase in legislative proposals and citizen referenda designed to
rein in managed care. 5 For the most part such proposals are aimed
ment approaches in OECD countries.
22. See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text for a description of universal
health coverage in OECD countries. The OECD was formed to study economic rela-
tionships among Atlantic Powers. See Rebecca A. Kirby, Note, The Basel Convention
and the Need for United States Implementation, GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 281, 287 n.25
(1994). The OECD's objective is "to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth
and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintain-
ing financial stability." Id. In 1996, the OECD included "Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia."
Sofia Wu, Taiwan Faces Stronger Competition After S. Korea OECD Entry, CENT.
NEWS AGENCY (Taiwan), Dec. 23, 1996.
23. See infra notes 170-181 and accompanying text for a discussion of how OECD
countries achieve universal health coverage; see also John V. Jacobi, The Ends of
Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 315 (1997) (noting "only the United
States relies on a competitive private marketplace and voluntary coverage"); Byron
Done, Health Care Reform and ERISA Preemption: Can the States Adopt Aspects of
Germany's Health Care System to Achieve Universal Access and Cost Containment?, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 745, 747 (1995) ("In contrast to the United States,
virtually every other western democracy guarantees their citizens access to health
care.").
24. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Trend Toward Managed Care Is Unpopular, Surveys
Find, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at 25 (describing the Harris survey which reported
that 54% of respondents believed "the trend toward managed care is harmful for
them"); see also Andy Miller, Survey: Dissatisfaction Rising with Managed Care in At-
lanta, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 19, 1999, at 2D (noting a survey of 150,000 U.S. con-
sumers by Hewitt Associates that showed an increase of national dissatisfaction with
managed care from 17% in 1997 to 22% in 1998).
25. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text for discussion of Patients' Bill of
Rights proposals and debate.
[Vol. 52:987
A MAN ON THE MOON
at creating a "Patients' Bill of Rights," which guarantees patients
with procedural protections against financially motivated decisions
by managed care entities." However, the debate about a "Patient's
Bill of Rights" is a side show which detracts from discussion about
the more central issue of health care in the United States: Can we
continue to allow our distrust of government to cheat us out of decent
health coverage?
Part II of this article will examine the Mythology and why it is
inappropriate to health care. Inevitably, the market will only produce
inadequate health coverage. This result is explained by market the-
ory and by problems which are indicative of a market failure in
health care. Part III will discuss problems inherent in utilizing an in-
surance model to provide health coverage. These inherent problems
are only exacerbated by the market. Part IV will further demonstrate
the idea that providing health coverage through an insurance model
operating in the market is Bad Business by describing the inevitable
flight from insurance risk that the private insurance industry has
undertaken during the past several years. Part V will discuss the fi-
nancing and payment mechanisms in countries that provide univer-
sal health care. Such countries have abandoned either the market,
the insurance model or both as a means of achieving universal health
coverage while controlling health care expenditures. Countries with
universal health coverage recognize the "public goods" quality of ade-
quate health coverage and respect the socialized risk sharing aspects
of insurance. These societal features of health coverage appear to be
all but forgotten by critics of additional direct governmental inter-
vention in health care financing in the United States. Part VI will
discuss the inevitable failure of cost containment policies in a system
of health coverage that relies on an insurance/market model.
II. OF MARKETS AND MADNESS - THE PROBLEM OF UNTAMED
EXTERNALITIES IN THE PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET
One scholar states the Mythology as follows: "Government ineffi-
ciency is so pervasive it has become an axiom."27 Such belief seems to
underlie Americans' notable distrust of government. 8 Economists
have bolstered this conventional wisdom with elaborate economic
26. See id.
27. Matthew W. McGann, Note, Federal Preemption: CSX Transportation Inc. v.
Easterwood: Give the Plaintiff a Brake; Derail Preemption, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 571, 584
n. 133 (1994); see also RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRACY
190-92 (1985) (describing the sources of governmental inefficiency as (1) "[t]he excess
burden of taxation"; (2) government bureaucrats' incentive to maximize their budgets;
(3) lack of an incentive to produce efficiently due to lack of individual entitlement to
profits; (4) "rent seeking" behavior; and (5) "special interest politics").
28. Roth, supra note 4, at 961.
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models designed to prove that government allocation of resources is
inherently and unavoidably inefficient.29 However, even if the My-
thology is generally true, ° it implodes when applied to health care."
29. Prescott, supra note 1, at 2019 ("During the past fifteen years, a growing cadre
of social scientists has used the tools of economic analysis to argue that when govern-
ments act, they do so inefficiently."); id. n.1 (citing DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 3-4 (1994) (noting economic models have
"raised the possibility that democratic institutions might be profoundly dysfunc-
tional")); HOLCOMBE, supra note 27, at 188-92 (discussing the sources of governmental
inefficiency); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 293, 296 (1992) (arguing that economists choose economic models according to
their outlook and ideology); Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy of Benefits
and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 643
(1981) (developing a theory that politics biases public decision making "toward larger
than efficient projects").
According to Hovenkamp:
The defense of the free market is inspired by the Coase Theorem and urges
that markets and private bargaining are generally better at achieving effi-
cient results than state intervention is. The attack on the welfare state is in-
spired by the pioneering work of Mancur Olson, James Buchanan, Gordon
Tullock, and others who have analyzed the functioning of public decision-
making bodies, as well as by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. The general
thrust of this attack has been to show that voting, where each individual
participant in a decisionmaking process receives one vote, cannot yield out-
comes that are either stable or socially optimal. In other words, political
markets cannot be shown to produce efficient outcomes the way that private
economic markets can.
Hovenkamp, supra, at 296 (footnotes omitted).
30. See DONALD WIrMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE 187 (1995). Witt-
man notes: "A number of studies have compared the technological efficiency of private
and public firms. Most, but by no means all, have shown private firms to be techno-
logically more efficient than public firms." Id. Wittman questions the appropriateness
of such comparisons by raising the question: "[M]aybe the enterprise is public because
it is less technologically efficient rather than it is technologically inefficient because it
is public." Id. He points to evidence in Eastern Europe that efficient enterprises are
privatized first. See id. Hovenkamp is also critical of the public choice theorists' char-
acterization of actors in political markets. As Hovenkamp states:
One reason that legislative markets fare so poorly in public choice theory
while Coasian markets fare so well is that voters and consumers seem to be
so different from each other .... The actors in public choice theory are not
the same people as the actors in neoclassical private markets. Perhaps they
are similar in some general sense-for example, both wish to maximize their
own utility. But beyond that they are quite different. Consumers are savvy,
cautious, and have a well-defined conception of their own best interest. Vot-
ers, by contrast, are easily manipulated by the most trivial things and pay
little attention to what is in their best interest. In neoclassical market the-
ory, competition weeds out or disciplines inefficient actors, and even in
Coasian bilateral monopolies the bargainers obtain efficient results. In po-
litical markets, by contrast, competition appears to have no effect: ineffective
lobbying organizations simply stay around and represent their constituents
inefficiently, thus ensuring that legislative favors go to someone else.
Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 316-17.
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Ironically, market theory itself explains the inherently and unavoid-
ably inadequate provision of health care that will result from reliance
on the market alone. In the United States, limited expansion of gov-
ernmental involvement in health care thus far acknowledges the ex-
istence of market failure, at least with respect to the most vulnerable
members of society-the poor, the elderly and the disabled-by fund-
ing for Medicare and Medicaid Programs.2 However, we cannot cor-
rect the market failure evident in the health care financing system
until the government brings the entire system under its comprehen-
sive control. Provision of health coverage based on the insurance
model in the market is subject to externalities which inhibit devel-
opment and maintenance of systems of adequate health coverage.
Health care is a peculiar commodity that differs from other goods
and services that are distributed in the market.33 The market for
health care is not a free market. In this regard, some policy analysts
have advocated measures that would remove the barriers to free
market operation of the health care sector. In their view, the fact
that the health care market does not act in accordance with the free
market is not due to anything special about health care. Instead they
attach blame for this "non-market" behavior to the fact that third
31. Jason B. Saunders, Note, International Health Care: Will the United States
Ever Adopt Health Care for All?-A Comparison Between Pro-posed United States Ap-
proaches to Health Care and the Single-Source Financing Systems of Denmark and The
Netherlands, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 711, 735 n.86 (1995) (citing Lawrence D.
Weiss, It's Time to Replace Private Health Insurance with a National Health Care Sys-
tem, 10 PRENTICE HALL HEALTHSPAN 13, 14 (1993)). "The public sector is more effi-
cient than the private sector in providing health insurance. One third or more of each
dollar paid for commercial health insurance goes for non-medical expenses, which is
almost ten times what it would cost the public sector to deliver the same health insur-
ance." Saunders, supra, at 735 n.89 (citations omitted).
32. William M. Sage, Funding Fairness: Public Investment, Proprietary Rights and
Access to Health Care Technology, 82 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1746 (1996) ("Government cur-
rently pays approximately forty percent of the health care dollar, primarily through
the federal Medicare program for the elderly and through federally supported but
state-administered Medicaid programs for poor families and the disabled.").
33. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 945 (1963) (discussing why markets for health risk coverage
are "poorly developed or nonexistent"). Part of the problem is attributable to the fact
that health care has special characteristics that distinguish it from other commodities.
Arrow lists the following as significant: (1) "[A]n individual's demand for medical ser-
vices is ... not steady in origin as, for example, for food or clothing, but irregular and
unpredictable." Id. at 948. (2) "[T]he behavior expected of sellers of medical care is dif-
ferent from that of business men in general" in that the medical seller's behavior is
"supposed to be governed by a concern for the customer's welfare" and not the seller's
own self interest. Id. at 949. (3) There is more "[u]ncertainty as to the quality of the
product.., than in any other important commodity." Id. at 951. (4) There is an ac-
knowledged inequality of knowledge between the patient and the physician. Id. (5) Re-
strictions on entry into the market by suppliers and (6) "unusual pricing practices and
attitudes." Id. at 953.
2000]
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party payers assume responsibility for paying for health services. 4
Third party payment removes individual incentive for the patient
and the physician to act as prudent consumers of health services.
These analysts argue that this lack of personal responsibility causes
high health care costs and inflation. They also argue that we should
return to a more market oriented health system by introducing more
personal responsibility for paying medical bills. 5 Sadly, this ap-
proach plays into the Mythology by blaming third party payment for
the health system's failure to cooperate with the dictates of the mar-
ket. This blind devotion to the market fails to recognize that the
problem with health care costs may be indicative of market failure.
Market failure would justify less reliance on the market approach to
health care financing and more governmental intervention.
According to classical economic theory, one legitimate basis for
governmental intervention in the market is the existence of market
failure. 6 Market failure exists when the market is unable to produce
an optimal allocation of goods. 7 This may result from the lack of
34. See Saunders, supra note 31, at 731 n.81 (citing Edmund F. Haislmaier, Why
Global Budgets and Price Controls Will Not Curb Health Costs, HERITAGE FOUNDA-
TION: BACKGROUNDER No. 929, March 8, 1993, at 2) (arguing that the health-care
system is overregulated and thus, not a free market system). "Medical costs are rising
because consumers are mostly insulated from such cost by the illusion that employers
pay for their health insurance coverage, and no free market in health care exists
because such markets have been disrupted by governmental policies." Id.; see also
Evan M. Melhado, Economists, Public Provision, and the Market: Changing Values in
Policy Debate, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 215, 236-37 (1998) (noting certain econo-
mists' concern that "insurance affords a price subsidy at the point of service, thereby
inducing the insured person to purchase more health services than optional").
35. See id; see also T.R. Marmor et al., Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform,
34 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1981) (describing consumer sovereignty advocates' belief
that restructuring of health markets requires increased cost sharing by consumers in
the form of increased deductibles, copayments or coinsurance). The rationale of this
view is that "making the consumer responsible for significant proportions of the cost of
care at the time of use would generate economizing alertness in both patients and doc-
tors..." Id. Abolition of the tax breaks for health care spending is another pro-market
reform. Id.
36. See, e.g., Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & James Ting-Yeh Yang, Financial Institu-
tions in Taiwan: An Analysis of the Regulatory Scheme, 4 J. CHINESE L. 3, 33 (1990)
("Under the efficiency criterion, government intervention in the free market is justified
only to the extent that such intervention is necessary to correct classical market fail-
ures."); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 334 (noting classical political econo-
mists "believed the state should stay entirely out of the business of transferring
wealth, and should provide only those things that the market fails to provide in the
proper amount, such as lighthouses, public streets or national defense"); Mark Sievers,
An Economic Analysis of Utility - Coal Company Relationships, 8 J. ENERGY L. &
POL'Y 27, 58 (1987) ("Under traditional welfare economics, regulation in the form of
government intervention is justified only when there is a 'market failure."') (citations
omitted).
37. Wang & Yang, supra note 36, at 33.
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competition, lack of information or high transaction costs.8 The exis-
tence of externalities will also cause market failure. 9 Externalities
are the effects of an individual's actions that the individual either
does not or cannot take into account when deciding to produce or
consume a good or a service. ° Externalities may be positive or nega-
tive and their existence results in allocations of resources that are
less than optimal for a society.4 The provision of health coverage
through an insurance model in the market is hampered by positive
and negative externalities which result in sub-optimal allocation of
health care coverage.
A positive externality exists when two conditions are present: (1)
an individual's consumption or production of a good or service pro-
duces benefits for third parties and (2) the individual cannot obtain
payment or other compensation from such third parties. Goods which
generate such positive externalities are known as "public goods."4
Because an individual cannot recoup the benefit accruing to the third
parties the rationally calculating individual will consume or produce
less of the good involved than might be socially optimal." For exam-
ple, suppose a wealthy resident of Los Angeles ("Ms. Market") could
purchase a device for $500,000,000 which could protect the city from
38. See id. at 41-42.
39. Id. at 33.
40. See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as
Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect
Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 17 (1989) ("An external effect of a transaction
is a positive or negative impact upon a person not a party to it.").
41. See, e.g., Melhado, supra note 34, at 221 ("Externalities result in a less than
optimal supply of... goods, and governmental action is mandated as a remedy.").
42. Id. (describing the public goods aspects of national defense). As noted by Mel-
hado:
As suggested by the archetypical case of national defense, a public good is
equally available to all citizens, all of whom benefit from it, whether or not
they contribute to paying its costs. External benefits flow to the nonpayers,
who cannot be excluded from consumption; nonexcludability in consumption
(or equal availability of the good) is the traditional criterion of a public
good....
Id. Melhado points out that national defense would be an example of a public good
which is characterized by nonexcludability in production in that the supply or produc-
tion units are equally available to all citizens. See id. He notes that other economists
have pointed to "another category of public goods for which externalities are generated
in consumption, that is, where the external benefit enjoyed by citizens lies in the con-
sumption of a good (e.g., education) by others." Id. at 225 (noting the analysis of James
Buchanan, in his book THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968)) (emphasis
omitted); see also HOLCOMBE, supra note 27, at 25 ("Many goods have public goods
characteristics because they produce significant spillover benefits, or because it is ex-
cessively costly to exclude consumers.").
43. See HOLCOMBE, supra note 27, at 25 ("[Public] goods will be underproduced in
the private sector, generating an efficiency argument for public sector production.").
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earthquakes. If the benefit that she would receive from purchasing
the device was only $250,000,000, Ms. Market wouldn't buy the de-
vice. However, if the total benefit that would accrue to all the resi-
dents was $500,000,001, it would make economic sense for someone
to purchase the device. However, absent some type of governmental
intervention, there would be no way to ensure that this purchase
would occur. If third parties could enjoy the benefit of the device
without having to pay for it (otherwise known as "free riding"), such
parties wouldn't contribute to its purchase." Therefore, if the deci-
sion to purchase the earthquake prevention system is left to the
market, Ms. Market would not privately purchase the system, be-
cause she would have no mechanism to require others to share the
costs of purchasing the device. Society in general would be worse off.
In a situation like the one facing Ms. Market, the government
could intervene to cause the purchase. It might do this by assessing
each resident some portion of the costs in order to prevent free riding
or it might subsidize Ms. Market's purchase. Ms. Market's earth-
quake prevention device would be a public good.4" The existence of
public goods features have justified government intervention in the
provision of national defense,"6 highway construction, 7 and public
education. 8
A negative externality results when an individual is not required
to bear all of the costs of their decision to produce or consume a good
or service. 9 For example, a handgun manufacturer who is not re-
44. See id. at 27-28 (noting that if public provision is called for "it would also call
for compulsory payment" to prevent free riding); see also Mark A. Hall & John D. Co-
lombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax
Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 392 (1991) ("Classical economics tells us that pro-
viding public goods is the quintessential role of government, since the government is
able to correct the free-rider defect through its power to tax-in essence coercing the
public's purchase of public goods.").
45. Cf. Melhado, supra note 34, at 221 (citing defense as an example of a good pub-
lic good).
46. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 44, at 391 (citing border defense as an example
of a pure public good).
47. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences,
and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 377 (1998) (noting that due to
the market failure problem known as "public goods" which would result in a sub-
optimal supply of national defense, roads, national parks, health, and education sys-
tems, the government assumes a major role in the provisions of such goods).
48. Id.; see also Joseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government
Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 377, 409 n.157 (1997) (noting public education is an ex-
ample of a public good from which all citizens benefit).
49. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Develop-
ment: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 505
n.16 (1998) ("A negative externality is a detriment suffered by a person other than the
one who produced it. Markets will oversupply goods or services that produce negative
externalities because the producer does not have to pay for all the adverse conse-
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quired to take into account the costs associated with the use of a
"Saturday night special" sold by the manufacturer will produce more
of those guns than is optimal for society." The existence of negative
externalities is another legitimate basis for government intervention
in the market. 1 The social recognition of negative externalities has
led to environmental laws to curb pollution, for example."
Adequate health care coverage has attributes of a public good.
An individual's status of being covered against health risks generates
positive externalities. An individual's status as a person covered by
some health plan benefits third parties. For example, health coverage
may prevent the spread of communicable disease either by preven-
tion or treatment. In addition, individuals appear to be more con-
cerned about the health status of others, than other life conditions.54
quences of the good or service and thus has no disincentive to produce more than the
socially optimal amount."); see also Dempsey, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
50. See Dempsey, supra note 40, at 20 (giving examples of alcohol, tobacco, and
firearms as goods for which the producers have not had to account for the cost to
health and life resulting from their use). Thinking about the social consequences of
handgun manufacturing in terms of the negative externalities created by such manu-
facturing gives new insight into the lawsuits filed by cities against such manufactur-
ers. Such suits may properly be viewed as an attempt to internalize the externalities of
production. See, e.g., Mark Schlinkmann, St. Louis Files Lawsuit Against 22 Defen-
dants -in Gun Industry, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 1, 1999, at 8 (describing law-
suits by St. Louis, New Orleans, Chicago, Bridgeport, Miami/Dade County, Atlanta,
and Cleveland to recoup damages resulting from use of handguns in such cities). In
addition, the lawsuits filed by various state attorney generals against the tobacco in-
dustry may be viewed along similar lines.
51. See Vandevelde, supra note 49, at 516-17.
52. See id. (giving the example of pollution); see also Stephen Breyer, Analyzing
Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 549, 555 (1979) (giving the example of production of steel and the air pollution
that it causes).
53. See Arrow, supra note 33, at 944. In discussing the concept of private and so-
cial costs and benefits, Arrow points to the example of the spread of communicable dis-
ease: "[a]n individual who fails to be immunized not only risks his own health, a dis-
utility which presumably he has weighed against the utility of avoiding the procedure,
but also that of others." Id.
54. Id. at 954; see also Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1449, 1483 (1994) (describing the moral discomfort we feel when others must do
without health care as an "intangible externality"). Elhauge explores various external-
ity arguments for the enactment of public provisions of health coverage for the poor.
Id. at 1480-86. He describes the externality associated with the failure to obtain im-
munizations. Id. at 1481. However, he believes that the existence of such an external-
ity provides a rationale for public provision of immunization rather than health cover-
age. See id. (stating that most health conditions which might result from inadequate
health coverage are not contagious and therefore, generate no such externalities). El-
hauge also explores the externality supposedly associated with the fact that people
without health coverage are forced to seek free medical care, the costs of which are
passed on to society in general. Id. at 1481-83. He criticizes this particular externality
argument because "[t]he amount and quality of health care provided free of charge is
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The amount of charitable giving with regard to health care and the
level and extent of volunteerism associated with health care provides
empirical evidence for the existence of interpendent utilities in
health care. 5 This indicates that a person's status as covered by
health care generates a positive benefit to third parties. However, it
is not possible for the individual who has health coverage to charge
third parties for such positive benefits. Therefore, like Ms. Market,
the individual will purchase health coverage at a level that is less
than optimal for society. Note that this public good analysis also ap-
plies to an employer who is making a decision about whether to pro-
vide health benefits for its employees. The employer cannot charge
third parties for the benefits such third parties enjoy as a result of
the employer providing adequate health coverage for its employees.
Therefore, the employer will provide coverage in amounts that are
less than optimal for society.
far from generous." Id. at 1482. Elhauge's view is that the moral discomfort externality
argument is the most defensible although he remains ultimately dissatisfied with this
justification. See id. at 1483-84. He offers his own justification for public provision of
health care by indicating the following:
what distinguishes health care [as a special case calling for public subsidy
for the poor] is not that there are better reasons for distributing it without
regard to ability to pay, but that there are fewer reasons to oppose such an
egalitarian distribution because providing health care reliably identifies and
meets a variable need with less harm to productive incentives than providing
other goods.
Id. at 1486; see also Roberta J. Labelle & Jeremiah E. Hurley, Implications of Basing
Health Care Resource Allocations on Cost-Utility Analysis in the Presence of External-
ities, in RESTRUCTURING CANADA'S HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 245, 247-50 (Raisa B.
Deber & Gail G. Thompson eds., 1990) (describing external benefits of health care).
Among the external benefits described in this article are benefits derived from inter-
dependent utility; i.e., when "one person's consumption of health care affects another
person's utility." Id. at 248. The authors identify three types of interdependent utility:
selfish, paternalistic, and altruistic. Id. As explained by the authors:
Selfish interdependence exists when individual A cares about individual B's
consumption of health services because B's consumption directly affects A's
health status. An example is treatment for a communicable disease: when B
is treated for hepatitis, thereby decreasing the probability that A will get the
disease, for purely selfish reasons A's utility increases. Paternalistic interde-
pendence exits when B's consumption of health care, B's level of health
status, or both, directly enter A's utility function. That is, A cares about B's
consumption of health care not because of its effects on A's health but be-
cause of its effects on B's health. Finally, altruistic interdependence exists
when B's level of utility (as opposed to health status) enters A's utility func-
tion. How B obtains this utility does not matter to A; the only thing that
matters to A is B's level of utility, which is determined only in part by B's
health status.
Id. at 248-49.
55. Labelle & Hurley, supra, note 54, at 249; see also Arrow, supra note 33, at 954
(describing a more general interdependence as the individual's concern for others'
health).
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Individuals' and employers' decisions to purchase health cover-
age, however, only expose one part of the externality problem inher-
ent in providing health coverage through the market. The insurance
industry engages in activities that also produce negative external-
ities. Insurance companies who decide to provide coverage at a set
premium are required to maximize profits." Insurance businesses
generate profits when premium income exceeds health care expendi-
tures paid by the insuring entity. 7 Without government intervention,
insurance companies will attempt to maximize profits by insuring
only persons who are good health risks or persons who are poor
health risks at premiums that are cost prohibitive. 8 They will engage
in mechanisms to weed out poor health risks, such as small groups
and individual underwriting, 9 excluding, or charging substantially
higher premiums to "those with pre-existing conditions," exclusions
of pre-existing conditions," ° exclusion of costly treatments,6 1 and po-
56. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, HEALTH INSURANCE IN PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL
VARIATIONS IN FINANCING, BENEFITS, AND PROBLEMS 16 (1991) ("The insurance carrier
and its investors also have a self interest: if they maximize premiums and minimize
losses, they earn profits and pay their staffs and sales agents generously.").
57. See id.
58. See Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer Mandate: Effi-
ciency and Equity Concerns, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 155, 207 (1994) (noting criticism of
the insurance industry's practices of "underwriting health insurance policies for small
groups and individuals" where such practices include "'cherry-pick[ing]' the least risky
insureds,... charg[ing] high-risk insureds very high premiums, or... completely
deny[ing] coverage to high-risk groups or individuals and those with pre-existing con-
ditions"). Pratt's article describes a panoply of insurance practices including insurance
"redlining"-"the practice employed by companies [to] systematically refuse to insure
certain high risk firms." Id. n.230 (citing Wendy Zellers, et al., Small Business Health
Insurance: Only the Healthy Need Apply, 11 HEALTH AFF. 164, 178 (1992)). "A firm can
be considered high-risk for a variety of reasons, including its industry type." Id. at 207
n.230. Pratt lists redlined industries as including:
hair salons, bars and taverns, entertainment businesses, mining, transporta-
tion services (including bus, limousine and taxi services), fishing industries,
logging and sawmills, detectives, security guards, collection agencies, manu-
facturing and distribution of explosives, hospitals, liquor stores, government
agencies and municipalities, junkyards and salvage firms, law firms, nursing
homes, trucking firms, restaurants and physician groups.
Id. at 208 n.230 (citing Zellers at 177) (noting that insurance is either not available to
such redlined industries or only available at a substantial additional premium); see
also Lewis D. Solomon & Tricia Asaro, Community-Based Health Care: A Legal and
Policy Analysis, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 235, 238 (1997) (noting commercial insurers, as
opposed to Blue Cross plans, adopted underwriting policies pursuant to which
"[a]pplicants [who were] perceived to be high risk might be charged higher premiums,
or be denied coverage for ... pre-existing conditions").
59. See Pratt, supra note 58, at 207.
60. Id.
61. See Jennifer Belk, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in Health
Insurance Contracts: A Proposal for Judicial Response, 66 WASH. L. REV. 809, 821
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tentially, genetic testing. 2 Just as in the manufacture of "Saturday
night specials," these exclusionary activities produce costs to society,
in general, that the insuring entity does not have to take into ac-
count.
The history of Blue Cross health plans illustrates the impact of
negative externalities in the health coverage market. Blue Cross
plans originally endeavored to insure all applicants in a designated
geographic region.63 They established their premiums by using com-
munity rating." Under community rating, the plans based an indi-
vidual's health insurance premium on the health experience of the
community in which the individual resided, not on the individual's
particular health status. 5 Community rating socialized health risks
and enabled individuals who might not otherwise be able to obtain
insurance to obtain such insurance.6 6 The advent of commercial in-
surers made it impossible for Blue Cross to continue this practice.
Commercial insurers recognized that in a community rating sys-
tem, where everyone paid the same premium, there would be win-
ners and losers. Winners were the individuals who were getting in-
surance at a cheaper premium than they would actually be willing to
pay because of their higher health risk. Losers were individuals
whose health status meant that they were probably paying more for
insurance than the individual benefit that they would derive from
the coverage. Recognizing this disparity, commercial insurers devel-
oped systems of individual health underwriting in which the insur-
ance company would screen each applicant and base the applicant's
premium on their individual health status.67 By utilizing individual
(1991) (noting that insurers may use "poorly defined experimental treatment exclu-
sions" to exclude coverage for treatments that are new and expensive, though arguably
not actually experimental).
62. See Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimina-
tion Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky. L.J. 503, 506-07 (1996-
1997). Holmes noted:
It is predicted that, as a result of the Human Genome Project ("HGP"), by the
year 2002, 99% of the human genome sequence will be mapped at an accu-
racy of 99.9%. Consequently, the HGP has the potential to have a major im-
pact on the ways insurers evaluate each applicant's health risks.
Id.
63. Jacobi, supra note 23, at 316 (describing the Blue Cross as the "first large scale
health insurance program in the United States"). Blue Cross Plans were nonprofit and
covered hospital costs. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (noting that Blue Cross's use of community rating made coverage available
"to all members of the community at the same rate, rather than higher rates to high
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risk underwriting, the commercial insurers could offer low health
risk insureds lower premiums and exclude high-risk insureds. This
would help maximize profits for the commercial insurers. As the low-
risk insureds abandoned the Blue Cross plans for the cheaper com-
mercial plans, this threatened to leave the Blue Cross plans with
only the higher risk individuals.68 This forced Blue Cross plans to
move to experience rating," which would increase the cost of insur-
ance for higher risk individuals. This decision would make health
coverage less available for high-risk individuals.
The commercial insurers did not have to take into account the
negative impact on the viability of Blue Cross plans and the avail-
ability of insurance for high-risk individuals. Hence, their actions,
which are perfectly defensible in the market, created negative exter-
nalities. This example underscores the inherent problem involved in
attempting to provide adequate health coverage pursuant to an in-
surance model in the private market. Cherry picking, as the practice
of weeding out poor insurance risk is called," produces a negative ex-
ternality. Without governmental intervention, the end result of
cherry picking would be that the only people with insurance would be
the ones least likely to need it. In the market, the tactics that lead to
this result are predictable, if not axiomatic.
The government has intervened to alleviate some of the impact
of externalities in the market for health care coverage. In order to in-
duce individuals and employers to purchase more insurance, the gov-
ernment provides an indirect subsidy by allowing a tax deduction for
health care expenses (including insurance premium payments)."
68. See GLASER, supra note 56, at 21 (noting that after Blue Cross plans faced
competition by commercial insurers who offered cheaper rates to younger and health-
ier individuals, "[i]n order to keep market share, the Blues throughout the country...
reluctantly moved toward age-graded rate structure for individuals, experience rates
with rebates of surplus to groups and exclusion clauses for poor health risks").
69. See id.
70. See Erica Worth Harris, The Regulation of Managed Care: Conquering Indi-
vidualism and Cynicism in America, 6 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 315, 353 n.199 (1999)
(describing cherry-picking as "setting up services and benefits to attract only the
healthiest individuals"); see also M. Cathleen Kaveny, Managed Care, Assisted Suicide
and Vulnerable Populations, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1289 (1998) (noting that
even when managed care companies are prohibited from risk underwriting, they may
engage in subtle practices to 'attract a desirable population and discourage an unde-
sirable one" and indicating that this practice is referred to as "cherry picking"); Ursula
Weide, A Comparison of American and German Cost Containment in Health Care: Tort
Liability of U.S. Managed Care Organizations vs. German Health Care Reform Legis-
lation, 13 TuL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 47, 55 (1998) (describing cherry-picking as selection of
participants according to their actuarial risk when healthier individuals are pre-
ferred).
71. See Melhado, supra note 34, at 241 ("The tax system subsidizes insurance in
several ways, principally by excluding employer contributions to the health benefits of
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Medicare and Medicaid are examples of governmental policy exceed-
ing an indirect subsidy and providing a direct subsidy for health cov-
erage for the elderly, the poor, and the disabled."2 These groups
would be the most likely to have difficulty procuring adequate health
coverage in the market. To deal with negative externalities, Congress
has passed laws that prohibit discrimination in the provision of
health coverage on the basis of a disability. 7 Congress has also lim-
ited the use of pre-existing limitations clauses in insurance policies,74
and mandated certain benefits.7 5 However, given the fact that forty-
four million people are not covered by any type of health coverage,76 it
is clear that the present level of governmental intervention in health
care financing has not adequately addressed the problem of external-
ities in the provision of health coverage.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE INSURANCE MODEL OF HEALTH COVERAGE
There is a real question about whether it is appropriate to pro-
vide health coverage pursuant to an insurance model at all, let alone
to provide it through an insurance model in the market.
In an insurance arrangement, the insured buys protection
against risk from the insurer.7 The insurer is willing to assume such
risk if it can set its premiums at a level that will cover the claims
employees from employee's taxable income and by allowing (at least partial) deduction
of individuals' premium payments from their taxable income."); see also Marmor et al.,
supra note 35, at 1004-05.
72. See Sage, supra note 32, at 1746.
73. See Laura J. Schacht, The Health Care Crisis: Improving Access for Employees
Covered By Self-Insured Health Plans Under ERISA and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & COMTEMP. L. 303, 307 (1994) ("The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ... appears to prohibit discrimination against people with dis-
abilities in all employment-related areas, including health care benefits.").
74. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-
191, §101(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 1939 (1996) (placing limitations on the use of pre-existing
condition exclusions in health policies).
75. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 9811 (a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998) (mandating coverage
for at least forty-eight hours of inpatient hospital care following a normal vaginal de-
livery and ninety-six hours following delivery by caesarean section). This federal law
was passed to address the problem of "drive through deliveries" wherein managed care
entities "routinely required that new mothers be discharged from the hospital shortly
after giving birth." Elizabeth C. Price, The Evolution of Health Care Decision-Making:
The Political Paradigm and Beyond, 65 TENN. L. REV. 619, 626 (1998); see also 29
U.S.C. § 1161-1167. Commonly referred to as COBRA, this federal law mandates con-
tinuation of coverage under group health plans for employees and their dependants
who lose coverage by termination of employment or otherwise. Id.
76. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
77. Scott A. Taylor, Taxing Captive Insurance: A New Solution for an Old Prob-
lem, 42 TAX L. 859, 875 (1989) (describing risk transfer aspect of insurance as a situa-
tion wherein "[a] person facing the possibility of a loss can purchase insurance ... and
thereby shift some or all of the financial consequences of the loss ... to the insurer").
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presented by the insured (plus administrative expenses and a
profit)."8 Generally, the insurance company cannot predict with accu-
racy what loss will result from a particular individual.79 However, the
insurer can reduce their risk somewhat by collecting premiums from
large numbers of insureds." This enables the insurer to take advan-
tage of the Law of Large Numbers.
The Law of Large Numbers, a postulate of probability theory,
states that the larger the number of insureds in a pool with uniform
expected losses from the risk insured against, the greater the likeli-
hood that aggregate experience of the group will reflect the expected
loss of an individual member of the group multiplied by the number
of members of the group." For example, assume that one person has
an expected loss of $50 (calculated by multiplying the probability of
the loss by the value of the loss). If the insurer insured just that one
individual, the insurer would be taking quite a risk by charging only
$50 because of the possibility that the insured could incur greater
expenses than $50. However, if the insurer covers 10,000 individuals,
each with an expected loss of $50, the Law of Large Numbers posits
that a premium of $50 per insured is more likely to cover the aggre-
gate loss experienced by the group.8"
Principles of insurance require the existence of four conditions in
order for the Law of Large Numbers to work: "(1) objectivity (occur-
rence of [the] event is readily discernible), (2) mass (sufficient num-
ber of insureds selected on a random basis), (3) homogeneity (prob-
ability of each exposure unit is equal), and (4) independence (one
event does not affect the outcome of another)."3 Life insurance meets
most of these conditions and the Law of Large Numbers works well
for life insurance.' When insuring against health risks, however, the
78. See GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 535 (3d ed. 1989).
The premium charged for the insurance may be inadequate for paying all
claims and expenses during the policy period, because it is only after the pe-
riod of protection has expired that the company can determine its actual
losses and expenses. Of course, the company hopes that the premium paid in
advance will be sufficient to pay all claims and expenses and yield a profit.
Id.
79. Joyce Nixson Hoffman & Elizabeth Zieser Kincaid, AIDS: The Challenge to Life
and Health Insurers' Freedom of Contract, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 716 (1986-87) (not-
ing the loss risk of any individual cannot be accurately predicted).
80. M. Mazen Anbari, Banking on a Bailout: Directors' and Officers' Liability In-
surance Policy Exclusions in the Context of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 547, 575 (1992) ("The insurer estimates its future obligations within a narrow
range by insuring a large pool of insureds with similar expected risks.").
81. See Taylor, supra note 77, at 878-79.
82. Id. at 879 ("In practice, the law of large numbers will permit the actual fre-
quency of an event to be predicted with an acceptable level of accuracy.").




insurer faces several obstacles to implementing an insurance pool
that takes advantage of the Law of Large Numbers.
One problem with the operation of the Law of Large Numbers on
health insurance is condition number three, the requirement of ho-
mogeneity. It is important that the insureds have a similar risk ex-
perience in order for the insurer to benefit from the Law of Large
Numbers. This is because homogeneity of the insured group allows
the insurer to predict its exposure to liability and establish its pre-
miums accordingly.8 Secondly, uniformity of risk exposure protects
against the problem of adverse selection.86 Adverse selection occurs
because when persons have a higher exposure to risk, they are more
likely to purchase insurance against that risk.87 In a consensual in-
surance model, where all insureds pay the same premium, this
means that high-risk individuals will purchase insurance and low-
risk individuals will not.8" This would threaten the stability of the
pool of insureds and, in turn, weaken the utility of the Law of Large
Numbers for the health insurer. 9
Persons seeking health coverage do not have a uniform expected
exposure to risk. For example, the elderly have more exposure than
young adults. Lifestyles, health status, income levels, education,
etc. all appear to cause variation in the expected loss."' Due to the
85. Anbari, supra note 80, at 575.
86. Id. at 575-76.
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id.
89. Id. ("'Obviously, as low-risk members drop out, a pool will consist more pre-
dominantly of high-risk members, requiring the premium to be raised and placing
greater pressure on the remaining low-risk members of the pool.' At the limit, the pool
may unravel altogether." (quoting George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1541 (1987))).
90. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Law and Economics of the Elderly, 4 ELDER L.J.
99, 135 (1996) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995)) ("Those
persons in the United States aged sixty-five and older, while accounting for about thir-
teen percent of the population, account for slightly more than thirty-three percent of
all our medical expenditures."); see also Fred R. Garzino, Undue Economic Influence on
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 1 DE PAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 537, 558 (1997) ("As the
percentage of elderly in the population increases, more health-care services will be re-
quired.") (footnote omitted); George P. Smith, II, Essay, Patient Dumping: Implications
for the Elderly, 6 ELDER L.J. 165, 180 (1998) (noting that the "elderly are more suscep-
tible to illness and disability than any other age group").
91. See Alan J. Widiss, To Insure or Not to Insure Persons Infected With the Virus
that Causes AIDS, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1617, 1644 n.114 (1992) (noting "[i]ndividuals may
be classified according to age, health, sex, occupation, habits (for example, the use of
tobacco or alcohol), and hobbies"); see also Paul J. Donahue, Federalism and the Fi-
nancing of Health Care in Canada and Switzerland: Lessons for Health Care Reform in
the United States, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 425 n.330 (1998) ("[H]ealth care
costs for females under 30 years of age are three times higher than for males within
this same age group."); Hoffman & Kincaid, supra note 79, at 715-16.
1006 [Vol. 52:987
A MAN ON THE MOON
phenomenon of adverse selection, this variation effectively prevents
operation of the Law of Large Numbers in the health insurance mar-
ket.
The health insurance market reacts to the inability to pursue the
Law of Large Numbers by adopting measures that either lessen the
risk assumed by the insurer or increase the premiums. As described
above, these measures-individual risk underwriting, cherry picking,
exclusion of pre-existing conditions, and ultimately genetic testing-
all generate negative externalities. Therefore, attempting to provide
coverage against health risk pursuant to an insurance model is
probably a flawed enterprise. Coupling that endeavor by attempting
to wed it to the dynamics of the market only exacerbates the prob-
lem.
Another casualty of the use of the insurance model in the market
is the demise of the socializing aspects of insurance. Insurance is ba-
sically socialized risk sharing." Individuals pool their risk in order to
spread the risk across greater numbers of people.93 This has the bene-
ficial effect of guaranteeing that no one individual will suffer the full
impact of the loss.94 However, when the insurance model is subjected
to the dictates of the market, the model yields corrupted results.
Profit maximization creates an interest in preventing high-risk indi-
viduals from obtaining membership in the insurer's pool of insureds.95
In this light, the demise of Blue Cross' use of community ratings in
the face of individual risk underwriting tactics of private health in-
surers takes on greater significance. It becomes less possible and less
profitable to socialize risk across categories of individuals who have
dissimilar expected losses to health risk. As persons of like exposure
are grouped together, those individuals are required to bear the bur-
92. See Jacobi, supra note 23, at 312 ("Health insurance is premised, in part, on
notions of mutual aid and social pooling-the common effort to ameliorate each per-
son's risk of catastrophic medical expense.") (citing GLASER, supra note 56, at 14).
93. Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA.
L. REV. 489, 498 (1991) "Most people are thought to be risk-averse. Insurance reduces
the risk associated with a venture and promotes economic efficiency by pooling to-
gether a large number of uncorrelated, individual risks. Each individual contributes to
a fund out of which losses are indemnified, thereby eliminating or minimizing her own
risk or level of uncertainty." Id.
94. See Anbari, supra note 80, at 575 (stating that insurance enables "individuals
to equalize the amount of money available to them over diverse states of the world-
states in which losses occur and those in which there are no losses" (quoting George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1539
(1987))).
95. See, e.g., GLASER, supra note 56, at 14 ("[I]nsurance implies a person's self-
centered calculations to protect himself against loss. A self-centered insurance com-
pany creates pools to spread risks, so it can market policies, bear the risks and earn
profits. But 'insurance' in this form is designed to avoid exceptionally risky persons,
not to protect them against loss for a social good.").
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den of their own conditions.' While some of their conditions may be
attributable to lifestyle choices," most of these conditions are not a
result of the individual. 8 In effect, allowing the insurance model to
operate in the free market undermines the socialized risk sharing
aspect of insurance because it creates fragmented insurance pools
wherein the persons in the pool must share similar characteristics.
The market will allocate most goods and services fairly well, par-
ticularly if the good or service involved does not raise issues of dis-
tributive justice (for example the distribution of compact discs). How-
ever, the market cannot allocate health coverage in a manner that is
beneficial to society. Reliance on the market as the vehicle by which
to allocate health coverage simply ignores the negative externalities
inherent in application of insurance principles to health coverage.
IV. THE MARKET'S FLIGHT FROM HEALTH INSURANCE
Private actors will consume goods and services with positive ex-
ternalities at a sub-optimal level and overindulge in activities that
generate negative externalities. The appropriate governmental re-
sponse to externalities in the market would be to implement laws to
ameliorate the impact of externalities. However, the federal govern-
ment has inadequately responded to externalities in the private
health coverage market.9 In fact, federal policy has ineptly aided and
abetted the private health insurance industry's flight from the busi-
ness of insuring against health expenditures.' ° This flight from
96. See Arrow, supra note 33, at 963-64. Arrow posits "insurance requires for its
full social benefit a maximum possible discrimination of risks. Those [individuals] in
groups of higher incidences of illness should pay higher premiums .... [E]qualization
[of premium costs for groups with dissimilar incidents of illness] could not in fact be
carried through if the market were genuinely competitive." Id. Arrow further explains
that in a competitive market "insurance plans could arise which charged lower premi-
ums to preferred risks and draw them off, leaving the plan which does not discrimi-
nate among risks with only an adverse selection of them." Id. at 964.
97. See Elhauge, supra note 54, at 1479 (citing growing evidence that health is in-
fluenced more by behavior than by health care).
98. See generally J. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death
in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207, 2207 (1993) (listing ten leading causes of death).
According to death certificates filed, the leading causes of death are: heart disease,
cancer, cerebrovascular disease, accidents, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
pneumonia and influenza, diabetes mellitus, suicide, chronic liver disease and cirrho-
sis, and human immuno-deficiency virus infection. Id. at 2207. The conditions leading
to death include a "combination of inborn (largely genetic) and external factors" (in-
cluding behavior and lifestyle). Id.; see also Mark A. Rothstein, Employee Selection
Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1379, 1384 (1983)
(examining factors that could increase susceptibility to illness caused by exposure to
toxic substances in the work place including genetics, age, race and ethnicity, geogra-
phy, diet, tobacco use, alcohol use, medical drugs, radiation, and lifestyle).
99. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA legislation).
100. See id.
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health insurance risk is reflected in employers' expanded use of self-
funded health benefit plans ("self funding") and the insurance indus-
try's increased use of risk sharing arrangements with health care
providers."' Under each of these arrangements, the private health
insurance industry avoids the business of insuring against health
risks by passing that function onto other actors-employers and
health care providers. This flight from insurance risk underscores
the flaw inherent in attempting to provide health coverage through
the insurance model in the private market. Insuring against health
risk is a poor business proposition which depends upon exploitation
of externalities for its success. Efforts to curb the exploitation of ex-
ternalities inevitably lead to a flight from health insurance risk by
the private insurance industry.
Employers have increasingly moved to self-funding to cover the
costs of their employees' health care.0 2 Under a self-funded plan, an
employer covers its employees' health care costs with the employer's
own funds rather than purchasing group health coverage from an in-
surer or health maintenance organization. 3 Under a self-funded
plan, the employer covers the first dollar amounts of its employees'
health care expenses. 4 The employer agrees to be responsible for
some combination of the first X dollars of its employees' aggregate
health expenses during a year and the first X dollars of expenses per
employee.' Once the aggregate or individual expense level is
reached, an insurer begins to cover the excess claims pursuant to a
stop-loss, or reinsurance agreement with the employer. 6
Under a self-funded plan, the employer operates as if it has an
insurance policy that is subject to a large deductible. Over forty per-
cent of all employees who receive their insurance through their em-
101. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (describing the most recent growth
in self insurance) and infra notes 133-63 and accompanying text (describing risk shar-
ing arrangements).
102. See Maria O'Brien Hylton, Insurance Risk Classification After McGann: Man-
aging Risk Efficiently in the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 72 (1995) (stat-
ing "[n]umerous commentators have noted the recent growth in self-insurance"). Self-
insurance rose 19.4% between 1988 and 1990, whereas conventional market premium
volume rose by only 3.8%. Id. at 72 n.43. Self-insurance was projected to reach 30% of
the market by the end of 1993. Id.
103. Schacht, supra note 73, at 311.
104. Id. at 312.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 313. Schacht explains:
[Self-funded] plans often purchase stop-loss insurance, a form of reinsurance.
Two forms of stop-loss insurance are available. Aggregate stop-loss insurance
covers aggregate claims for the employer if claims exceed a specified amount.
Specific stop-loss insurance covers claims in excess of a specified amount
during a particular period for a covered individual.
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ployment are covered by a self-funded plan. °7 Moreover, nearly
ninety percent of all large employers have self-funded plans."1'
Self-funding is a reaction to states efforts to address external-
ities in the private health coverage market. The problems with ex-
ternalities, as described in Part II, include employers who choose
sub-optimal health coverage for their employees and insurers' at-
tempts to avoid covering high risk individuals.' ° A government could
react to these problems by intervening in the private sector provision
of health coverage. In order to respond to the sub-optimal level of
health coverage induced by "public goods" attributes of health cover-
age, a state could, for example, mandate that employers provide
health coverage for their employees. A state could also constrain the
insurance industry's predilection for behavior which induces negative
externalities by, for example, prohibiting individual risk underwrit-
ing and cherry-picking. A state that passed laws addressed at these
activities could induce more optimal consumption of health care cov-
erage within the state. To varying degrees, the states have shown a
desire to undertake such measures.?
The states' ability to address the problems of externalities in the
private health coverage market, however, has been undermined by
the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")."' ERISA is a federal law which governs employer pro-
vided pension and welfare benefit plans."' ERISA, however, with lim-
ited exceptions, does not dictate to an employer the benefits that
must be provided in any employer's benefit plan."' Furthermore,
ERISA preempts any and all state laws which relate to an employee
pension or welfare benefit plan."' Therefore, it preempts any state
law which would dictate that an employer provide any health benefit
or any level of benefit for its employees. Under ERISA, states are
prohibited from regulating the content of any employer provided
107. Id. at 311 (noting that by 1991 64% of all employers were self-insured and over
40% of all employees were covered by a plan of self-insurance).
108. Id. at 305 (stating "ninety percent of Fortune 500 companies self-insure their
health plans").
109. See infra Section II.
110. See Hylton, supra note 102, at 77 (describing doubling of state-mandated
health insurance benefits between 1979 and 1989). Mandated benefits included ma-
ternity coverage, mental health coverage, prosthetic devices, and alcohol and drug
treatments. Id. at 75.
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
112. Id.
113. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (discussing that ERISA
does not require employers to provide any particular benefits, holding "ERISA does not
regulate the substantive context of welfare-benefit plans").
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
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benefit package."'
Although ERISA preempts state laws related to employee benefit
plans, it does not preempt state laws regulating the business of in-
surance."6 This would seem to leave states with a viable avenue by
which to address insurance industry practices which generate nega-
tive externalities. However, this method of addressing externalities
in the private sector provision of health coverage is weakened by the
proliferation of employer self-funded health plans. The significance of
self-funding as an obstacle to state's efforts to address externalities
in the health coverage market is underscored in the Supreme Court
decision Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts."7 Metro-
politan Life is instructive because it reveals how inept federal policy
has undermined states' efforts to address externalities. It also illus-
trates that federal policy has aided and abetted the flight from insur-
ance risk by the private insurance industry.
In Metropolitan Life, the Court decided whether ERISA pre-
empted a Massachusetts law that mandated that insurance policies
issued in the state contain coverage for mental illness."8 Massachu-
setts implemented this law to address a symptom of externalities in
the private health coverage market arising from private insurers'
predictable response to problems inherent in the insurance model.
Insurers would not offer mental health coverage because of the prob-
lem of adverse selection-the persons likely to purchase such insur-
ance are the very ones who are likely to need it."' By mandating cov-
erage for mental illness, Massachusetts attempted to place mental
illness in the shared risk pool for all illnesses and attempted to re-
quire the industry to make such coverage available at a less expen-
sive price.2 ° Massachusetts's response to the lack of private sector
115. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
116. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (A). This provision states, "[e]xcept
as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to ex-
empt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, bank-
ing, or securities." Id.
117. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
118. Id. at 727.
119. Id. at 731.
120. Id. This rationale for the Massachusetts law appears to be used by state legis-
lators generally to justify state-mandated benefit provisions. See Hylton, supra note
102, at 76. Hylton explains:
Insurers and purchasers may unknowingly undervalue the benefits of some
type of care, such as chemical dependency treatment, resulting in a demand
for coverage which is "too low" from a societal perspective .... [W]ithout
mandates, adverse selection might occur which drives up employers' cost of
particular coverages. This happens if individuals with chronic conditions
tend to enroll in plans offering more extensive coverage ... and healthier in-
dividuals opt for low-benefit plans .... [A]dverse selection creates a market
shortcoming, which a mandate may be partially able to correct.
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provision of mental health coverage was an appropriate strategy for
addressing the problem of externalities in the private health cover-
age market.
12 1
In Metropolitan Life, the Court upheld the state's imposition of
the mandated benefit requirement on insurers selling health insur-
ance policies. 2' On the other hand, the Court noted that the state
could not impose such a requirement on any employer if the employer
chose to provide health coverage through self-funding.'23 The self-
funded/purchased policy distinction described in Metropolitan Life
illustrates that if an employer provides health coverage to its em-
ployees by purchasing a group health insurance policy or HMO cov-
erage, the resulting benefit will include state law mandated options
and benefits. Many of these options and benefits address problems of
externalities in the private sector provision of health coverage. On
the other hand, employers may self-fund their health coverage and
thereby design benefit packages that do not reflect state policymak-
ing. This self-funded/purchased policy distinction accounts for the
continuing problem of externalities in the private health coverage
sector.
Self-funding also allows the insurance industry to extricate itself
from the business of insuring health risk. Unlike the situation where
an employer purchases a group health policy or health maintenance
organization coverage, under self-funding the employer, not the in-
surance company, is at risk for the health expenditures of the em-
ployer's employees. Self-funding allows the insurance industry to
thrive in a capacity other than as the first dollar insurer of health
risks.
Rather than operate as the first dollar insurer of health claims,
the industry pursues other less risky roles in the health care financ-
ing system. The industry offers stop loss or reinsurance coverage,
provides claims processing and utilization management services, and
network management through administrative services only ("ASO")
contacts."4 Finally, the movement toward self-funded benefit ar-
Id. (quoting Gail A. Jensen & Jon R. Gabel, State Mandated Benefits and the Small
Firm's Decision to Offer Insurance, 4 J. REG. ECON. 379, 380 (1992)).
121. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 731.
122. Id. at 744.
123. See id. at 746-47.
124. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health
Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 295 (1990) (noting that self-
insured employers "may turn to an insurance company to provide administrative ser-
vices or stop-loss coverage"); see also John J. Munnelly, Administrative Services Con-
tracts, 17 FORUM 987, 988-89 (1982). Munnelly explains:
Under the ASO contract, the insurance carrier assumes no risk,. . . [it] only
provides claims and other administrative services to the contract holder.
Through such an arrangement, the insurer can make its expertise in claims
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rangements contributes to undermining the socialized risk aspects of
insurance.' Being able to adopt tailor-made health coverage plans
allows employers to opt-out of the common risk pool for health ex-
penditures. 26
Risk sharing is another example of the flight from health insur-
ance risk by the insurance industry. Instead of fully assuming risk
for health expenditures in exchange for collected insurance premi-
ums, under risk sharing arrangements, the insurance industry trans-
fers some of the risk to health care providers. 27 The insurance indus-
try implements risk sharing through compensation arrangements
with health care providers which deviate from fee for service ar-
rangements. 26 Such alternative compensation arrangements include
capitation payments, risk pools with fee withholds, and percentages
of premium arrangements.129 The key feature of these alternate com-
pensation arrangements is that the insurance company decreases the
risk that the expenditures it is obligated to cover exceed the premi-
ums it has collected. The risk is instead borne by the health care pro-
viders to varying degrees. To the extent that federal policy allows the
industry to export risk, such federal policy lowers the uncertainty in-
herent in insuring against health expenses. This encourages a pri-
vate sector presence in the provision of health coverage. In fact, a le-
nient posture toward risk sharing is actually a form of subsidy
granted to the private health insurers. Although the need for subsi-
dies in health care is inevitable, the subsidy provided to the private
health insurance industry in the United States is inadequate and in-
efficient to produce optimal health coverage.'
Under the traditional system in which indemnity insurance was
the dominant financing mechanism, health care providers primarily
received payment on the basis of "fee-for-service. 21 Fee-for-service
handling, cost control, benefit development and design and actuarial science
available to self-insured programs.
Id; see also David A. Engel, ERISA, To Preempt or Not To Preempt, That Is a Ques-
tion!, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 431, 433 (1987) (describing types of administrative services
that insurance companies provide to self-insured employers, including claims process-
ing, benefit calculation, enrolling members and making rulings on claim denial ap-
peals).
125. See Jacobi, supra note 23, at 317 (stating "[i]n order to avoid furthering the
socialization effects of shared pooling, large employers increasingly avoided formal in-
surance ... opting to self-fund their health plans").
126. See id.




130. See infra Part V.
131. See Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of
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means there is a particular payment associated with each unit of
service delivery (for example an hourly charge or a charge per proce-
dure performed). 3 The modem health care environment, which is
dominated by managed care, is characterized by compensation ar-
rangements that deviate from retrospective fee-for-service.'33 Under
managed care, providers may be compensated pursuant to a number
of different methodologies: (1) resource based relative value scale;'
(2) diagnosis related groups; 3' (3) capitation;... and (4) percent of
Life, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1393, 1405 (1999) (explaining "[t]he American medical system,
from the early part of the twentieth century until roughly 1970, was structured around
two important and complementary concepts: fee-for-service medicine and indemnity
insurance"); see also Kim Johnston, Patient Advocates or Patient Adversaries? Using
Fiduciary Law to Compel Disclosure of Managed Care Financial Incentives, 35 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 951, 952 n.2 (1998) (noting "[u]nder traditional indemnity insurance,
doctors are paid on a fee-for-service basis"); Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Man-
aged Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 399, 400 (1996) (de-
scribing fee-for-service and indemnity insurance plans as the "dominant method of
reimbursement for physician medical care" until more recent years).
132. See Edward P. Richards, Symposium Introduction Past as Prolog: Can Man-
aged Care Overcome the Conflicts Inherited from Fee-for-Service Medicine?, 66 UNIV.
Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 735, 735 n.6 (1998) ("Fee-for-service is the general term used by
health care economists to refer to payment systems that pay health care providers
based on the specific services they provide."); see also Lisa Axelrod, The Trend Toward
Medicaid Managed Care: Is the Government Selling Out the Medicaid Poor, 7 B.U.
PUB. INT. L. J. 251, 257 n.52 (noting a "[flee-for-service is a physician payment method
where a doctor is paid for each service he provides, rather than a set fee for all services
he provides"); Julie Y. Park, PHOs and the 1996 Federal Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines: Ensuring the Formation of Procompetitive Multprovider Networks, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1684, 1685 n.6 (noting that under fee-for-service there is a separate price paid for
every medical service).
133. MARK V. PAULY ET AL., PAYING PHYSICIANS, OPTIONS FOR CONTROLLING COST,
VOLUME, AND INTENSITY OF SERVICES 104 (1992) (noting increase in use of capitation
payments during the 1970s and survey results indicating use of capitation payments
by 46% of all HMOs in 1987).
134. Andrew Ruskin, Capitation: The Legal Implications of Using Capitation to Af-
fect Physician Decision-Making Processes, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 391, 420
(1997) (noting that some managed care organizations compensate physicians on the
basis of resource based relative value); see also Molly Tschida, Making the Cut: Cigna's
Payment Slash Has Arizona Physicians Worried, MOD. PHYSICIAN, Jan. 1, 1999, at 14
(noting proposed cut in physician compensation by Cigna from 100% of RBRVS to
90%); American Academy of Pediatrics, Res.-Based Relative Value Scale Project Advi-
sory Comm., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Issues in the Application of the Resource-Based
Relative Value Scale System to Pediatrics: A Subject Review, PEDIATRICS, Oct. 1998, at
996 [hereinafter PEDIATRICS] (noting that many third-party payers, including man-
aged care organizations, use some variation of the Medicare RBRVS to compensate
physicians); Aetna, Cigna, PacifiCare Undertake Innovative Recontracting with Pro-
viders Following Huge Mergers, MANAGED CARE WEEK, Jan. 26, 1998, available at
1998 WL 9850913 (noting Aetna's use of RBRVS).
135. Chris Rauber, De-Capitating Managed-Care Contracts: Some Providers Say
Global Capitation Has Tied a Noose Around Their Finances, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept.
6, 1999, at 52 (noting that the 1998 survey indicated 50% of all HMOs surveyed used
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premium.137
A resource based relative value scale ("RBRVS") is a prospective
fee schedule for physician's services, wherein the fee is determined
by multiplying a relative value for the service provided times a con-
version factor."8 Diagnosis Related Groups ("DRG") is a form of
prospective reimbursement for hospital services.' 9 Under a DRG
DRG-based payments); see also Richard C. Seaberg et al., Planning and Implementing
Total Laboratory Automation at the North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System
Laboratories, MED. LABORATORY OBSERVER, June 1, 1999, available at 46 WL
12963073 (noting managed care companies' use of DRG-type reimbursement for outpa-
tient services).
136. Ericka L. Rutenberg, Managed Care and the Business of Insurance: When Is a
Provider Group Considered to Be at Risk?, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 267, 292
(1996) (describing capitation as a system "where the PSO [physician sponsored organi-
zation] provides its services in return for a fixed payment per month for each patient
assigned to it").
137. Id. (describing percentage of premium arrangement as the situation where "the
PSO [physician sponsored organization] is paid a fixed percentage of the premium paid
to the HMO").
138. Ruskin, supra note 134, at 419. According to Ruskin:
[T]his mechanism pays physicians a rate based on the number of relative
value units earned through their services. These units are determined by a
physician's use of "physical and mental effort, technical skill, and practice
experience." Thus, more arduous tasks are rewarded with higher reim-
bursement. After setting this baseline rate, HCFA makes adjustments for
geographic practice costs. It then multiplies this figure with a conversion fac-
tor that turns each service into a dollar figure.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
originally adopted the reimbursement methodology for compensating physicians par-
ticipating in Medicare. Id.; see also PAULY, supra note 133, at 3-5 (describing imple-
mentation of RBRVS fee schedule by Medicare); PEDIATRICS, supra note 134 (describ-
ing development and implementation of the RBRVS fee schedule by the HCFA);
Michael K. Beard, The Impact of Changes in Health Care Provider Reimbursement
Systems on the Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in Personal Injury Suits, 21
AM. J. TRIAL ADvoC. 453, 468 (1998) (noting Medicare's implementation of RBRVS to
"control physician reimbursement"); PAULY, supra note 133, at 3-5 (noting that deter-
mination of relative vaule of physician services takes into account physician's time,
effort, practice expenses, and cost of malpractice insurance). The payment for any par-
ticular service is determined by the relative value unit assigned to the service multi-
plied by the conversion factor. PEDIATRICS, supra note 134, at 996. Previously, HCFA
used three separate conversion factors: one for surgical services, one for nonsurgical
services, and one for primary care services. Id. In 1998, however, HCFA adopted a uni-
fied conversion factor. Id. RBRVS was Medicare's effort to control both the volume and
the cost of physician services. See PAULY, supra note 133, at 1. In order to control the
volume of services in anticipation that physicians would attempt to regain loss reve-
nue resulting from the discount imposed by RBRVS, Medicare adopted Volume Per-
formance Standards. Id. at 5. Accordingly, Congress sets a budget expenditure target.
Id. "If expenditures are excessive, relative to the congressional standard, in any given
year the update in the fee schedule's dollar conversion factor will be reduced." Id.; see
also Ruskin, supra note 134, at 419 (noting "overutilization one year results in a lower
conversion factor the next year").
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spective reimbursement for hospital services. 3 ' Under a DRG system,
the payment for hospital services is prospectively determined based
on the patient's diagnosis upon admission to a hospital.14 ° Regardless
of how long the patient is in the hospital receiving treatment, the
hospital will receive the same amount of reimbursement."' Under a
capitation arrangement, a physician (or physician group) is paid a
lump sum payment on a periodic basis (typically monthly).4 ' The
amount of the payment is determined by the number of patients as-
signed to the physician. The payment is the same regardless of
whether or not the patients actually receive services from the physi-
cian during the month.' Capitation may be specific to the services
for which the physician (or physician group) is responsible (for exam-
ple, PCP services).'44 Capitation may otherwise be global or all inclu-
sive, in which case the capitation would be specified to cover not only
the physician's services, but other services as well. For example,
capitation may cover services of physicians outside of the group, hos-
pital expenses, and costs of drugs.'4' Managed care entities may also
compensate a physician group under a percentage of premium ar-
rangement.'46 Pursuant to such an arrangement, the payer pays the
provider a designated percentage of the insurance premiums col-
lected by the insurer."'
Managed care entities share the financial risk associated with
139. See Beard, supra note 138, at 468 (describing DRG, as fixed hospital prices as-
signed to each of 470 medical diagnoses pursuant to which, hospitals receive a preset
reimbursement); see also Richards, supra note 132, at 747 (noting the "DRG system
pays hospitals the average cost of caring for a patient with a given diagnosis"). DRGs
were implemented by Medicare to control hospital cost. See id.
140. See Beard, supra note 138, at 468; see also Richards, supra note 133, at 747. As
described by Richards:
[I]f a Medicare patient is admitted with bacterial pnenomia, the hospital gets
a fixed payment based on the diagnosis .... For this fixed payment, the hos-
pital has to provide all of the care the patient needs-tests, drugs, nursing
care-except for physician services .... If the hospital spends more than the
DRG payment on the patient, then the amount the hospital goes over the
DRG is a loss. If the hospital can treat and discharge the patient for less
than the DRG, the hospital gets to keep the difference as profit.
Id.
141. Id.
142. PAULY, supra note 133, at 101 ("[A] capitated payment... is a fixed 'per head'
payment to a health care provider for... a defined period of time.").
143. Id.
144. Id. at 105. For example, capitation may be specific to primary care services. Id.
145. Id. (noting 40% of HMOs responding to a survey published in 1987 required
PCPs to pay for laboratory tests from their capitation payments or from a fund that
included their capitation payments).
146. Rutenberg, supra note 136, at 292.
147. Id.
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insuring against health expenditures with physicians and other pro-
viders through the above-referenced compensation arrangements. We
can understand how a managed care entity shifts financial risk to a
provider by examining the financial risks imposed upon traditional
indemnity insurers. Under an indemnity arrangement, the risk bear-
ing entity (the insurer) collects insurance premiums from the insur-
eds. Its goal is to collect enough premiums to be able to cover: (1) the
costs of claims for which it will be responsible; (2) its administrative
expenses; and (3) a profit. " 8 The traditional indemnity insurer was at
financial risk that the insurance premiums it collected would not be
sufficient to cover the items mentioned above. In order to limit the
risk, the insurer could also engage in risk underwriting (screening
individuals), bar coverage for preexisting conditions, and exclude cer-
tain conditions and treatments from coverage. " ' The item which was
least subject to the insurers' control and posed the greatest financial
threat was the expenses for claims submitted by a provider who ren-
dered services for the insured. The problem with this system was
that the provider's actions were uncontrollable. 0 Under a fee-for-
service arrangement, doing everything possible for a patient was
consistent with the provider's own financial interests."'
148. Gil B. Fried, Punitive Damages and Corporate Liability Analysis in Sports
Litigation, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 45, 55 (1998) (noting that insurers attempt to set
premiums through experience rating at a level which would cover all claims paid in a
prior period with a additional amount to cover unusually large claims and insurance
company administrative expense and profit); see also Roberta M. Berry, The Human
Genome Project and the End of Insurance, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 216 (1996)
(describing premium establishment mechanism as involving desire for profit and need
to cover administrative costs and claims incurred).
149. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text for a description of insurance
industry practices.
150. See Brian A. Liang, De-Selection Under Harper v. Health Source: A Blow for
Maintaining Patient-Physician Relationships in the Era of Managed Care?, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 799, 853 (1997) (describing physician's unlimited discretion during days
of indemnity insurance which meant that "[t]here were no financial or other limita-
tions or controls exercised by the insurance company over the physician under this
blank check approach"); see also Price, supra note 75, at 620 ("Traditionally, health
care decisions in the United States were made according to the provider paradigm, in
which providers-primarily physicians-held virtually unfettered authority to recom-
mend and treat patients .... ").
151. See Meisel, supra note 131, at 1408. Meisel explains that
[u]nder a fee-for-service system, the financial incentives were skewed in fa-
vor of the doctor treating the patient. Doctors made money when patients
were sick, and they made more when patients were sicker ... when patients
were in need of treatment, the financial incentives of fee-for-
service/indemnity insurance medicine were generally aligned with patients'
interest in getting the medical treatment they needed. The financial incen-





To the extent that an insurer utilizes fee structures that deviate
from retrospective, fee-for-service arrangements, it is able to (1) in-
troduce more predictability in its expenses; (2) disrupt the providers'
inclination to assume that more services are better and;52 (3) shift
financial risk from itself to the providers.153 This ability strengthens
the argument for a system the furtherest away from any type of fee-
for-service arrangement that the insurer can institute. Under any
type of fee-for-service arrangement, whether the fee is determined
retrospectively or prospectively, the insurer still remains at risk for
the total expenses that it will be called upon to cover. Although it
knows what it will pay for any unit of service delivered, it will still
not be able to control the volume of services. Therefore, any of the
fee-based compensation mechanisms still leave the insurer at finan-
cial risk, for example, discounted fee-for-service arrangements,
RBRVS, and DRGs. Payment arrangements that sever the relation-
ship between the unit of service provided and the compensation pro-
vide an insurer with greater insulation from financial risk.1"4 For ex-
ample, an insurer knows what it will have to pay for services
152. See, e.g., PAULY, supra note 133, at 102 (noting that a physician's financial re-
sponsibility for ancillary services and consultation creates a strong incentive for physi-
cians to control those services).
153. Id. at 101. Under capitation the provider receives the same predetermined
payment regardless of the costs of providing the services covered by the capitation pay-
ment. Id. According to Pauly:
When actual costs of care are less than the captitated payment, the provider
keeps the 'profit"; if actual costs are more than the payment... the provider
is financially responsible. This payment method in effect merges some of the
insurance function with the provider function in that a portion of the finan-
cial risk is borne by the provider.
Id.
154. See Thomas Bodenheimer, Reimbursing Physicians and Hospitals, 12 JAMA
971, 971 (1994). As Bodenheimer explains:
Methods of payment lie along a continuum that extends from the least to the
most aggregated unit. Under fee-for-service reimbursement, the unit of pay-
ment is the visit or procedure: the physician or hospital is paid a fee for each
office visit, ECG, intravenous fluid, or other service or supply provided. All
other reimbursement modes aggregate or bundle together several services
into one unit of payment. Reimbursement by episode of illness pays physi-
cians or hospitals one sum for all services delivered during one illness, for
example, global surgical fees to physicians and DRGs for hospitals. Per diem
payments to hospitals bundle all services delivered to a patient during 1 day.
A further bundling of services is accomplished by capitation payment, in
which one payment is made for each patient's treatment during a month or
year .... Payment based on all services delivered to all patients within a
certain period includes global budget reimbursement of hospitals and sala-
ried payment of physicians.
Id. (footnote omitted). "As a general rule, the more that services are bundled into one
payment, the more the financial risk of illness shifts from the payer to provider." Id. at
973.
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rendered by a primary care physician ("PCP") receiving capitation
payments for patients assigned to the PCP. The expense does not
vary with the unit of services actually provided by the PCP."' In fact,
if the entity can globally capitate a provider or group of providers, it
achieves total predictability of expenses and hence, zero financial
risk.
166
Insurers may manage some of the financial risk inherent in fee-
for-service arrangements or nonglobal capitation by the use of fee
withholding.'57 Under fee withholding, some percentage of the pro-
vider's compensation is withheld by the insurer and put at risk for
services not provided by the providers.' The typical situation in-
volves a PCP. PCPs are responsible for coordinating health care of
patients assigned to them. Inpatient hospital admissions and ser-
vices provided by specialists require the approval of the patient's
PCP. "' If the PCP receives compensation on a fee-for-service basis or
receives nonglobal capitation, the compensation only covers the
PCP's services. 6 ' However, the PCP's decisions with respect to refer-
rals to specialists, inpatient hospital admissions, and drug prescrip-
tion will have an impact on the insurer's expenses as well. Under a
fee withholding arrangement, the insurer is able to align the PCP's
155. See PAULY, supra note 133, at 105 ("By setting the level of payment per person
prospectively, it is true by definition that total expenditures will be affected only by
the number of persons at risk, not by variations in the volume and intensity of services
provided.").
156. See, e.g., Rauber, supra note 135, at 52 (noting that under global capitation
model monthly "payment is expected to cover any and all healthcare services provided
by a hospital, physicians and ancillary services").
157. See PAULY, supra note 133, at 105 (noting that in a 1987 survey, "two-thirds of
all HMOs appear[ed] to use withholding[s]").
158. See id. at 103. Fifty-four percent of HMOs responding to a survey in 1987 indi-
cated that they withheld a percentage of PCPs fees "in case their use of actuarially
budgeted funds for referral to specialists was too high." Id. at 105.
159. See Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty,
and Physician Self Interest, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 207 (1995) (noting the use of
PCPs as gate keepers who must approve all specialty referrals); see also Carl H.
Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational Models, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 273, 283 (1994) (noting the role of primary care doctors as gate-
keepers who must approve or arrange referrals to specialists and facilities); Marc A.
Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform Proposals, and
Trade-Offs, 32 HoUs. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (1996) (noting the role of PCPs as gatekeep-
ers).
160. See PAULY, supra note 133, at 106 (distinguishing between partial and com-
prehensive (global) capitation). "Capitation payment to physicians is usually restricted
to any services provided directly by the primary care physician." Id. at 105; see also
Rutenberg, supra note 136, at 292 (distinguishing between capitation which involves
payment to a physician organization for the services the organization provides versus
global capitation which is designed to cover services provided by the organization and
by providers outside of the organization).
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financial interests with the insurer's financial interests vis-a-vis the
expenses for specialists, inpatient hospital admissions, and drugs.
This is achieved by placing a portion of the PCP's fees at risk for
these expenses. Under a typical scenario, the managed care entity
will retain a designated percentage of the fees earned by the physi-
cian.161 The fees are set aside in a withhold fund.'62 At the end of the
year, if the managed care entity expenses for designated services ex-
ceed what the managed care entity's had budgeted for such expenses,
the physician's withheld fees would be used to reimburse the man-
aged care entity for the excess expenditures.163 If, on the other hand,
the actual expenditures were less than the budgeted amounts, the
physician would recoup the withheld fees.'
These alternative compensation arrangements allow insurance
companies to escape from the business of insuring against health
risk. The industry's ability to engage in such arrangements was
aided and abetted by federal policies which undermined state laws
that would prohibit such arrangements. State laws prohibited the
corporate practice of medicine and fee splitting.6 ' Under these laws,
a physician was required to maintain financial autonomy from lay-
persons which meant the physician could only accept the physician's
professional fees as compensation for the physician's services.'66 This
meant the physician could not accept salaries or other alternative
means of compensation (e.g., capitation payments).167 Under the in-
surance codes of most states, only licensed insurers could assume the
financial risk associated with health expenses. 66 The cost contain-
ment environment of the 1980s and 1990s led to a relaxation of these
considerations. In fact, under the Federal HMO Act, federally quali-
fied HMOs were exempt from restrictive state laws.9 The Federal
161. PAULY, supra note 133, at 103 (discussing the frequent practice of withholding




165. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Comment, The Corporate Practice of Medi-
cine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV.
445 (1987) (discussing various state laws which prohibit the corporate practice of
medicine).
166. See id. at 468 (discussing the reluctance of courts to distinguish between the
professional services of a physican and the administrative duties of a layperson em-
ployed by a corporation that employs physicans).
167. See Sheva J. Sanders, Regulating Managed Care Plans Under Current Law: A
Radical Reversion to Established Doctrine, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 73, 86 (1991) (mention-
ing the danger of financial incentives).
168. See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial
Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 21 (1993).
169. See Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100, 87 Stat.
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Trade Commission prohibited the American Medical Association
from issuing ethical proscriptions against the corporate practice of
medicine and fee splitting.17 ° Federal policy also endorsed risk shar-
ing as a means to reduce health care expenditures.' These actions
all contributed to a flight from health insurance risk by the private
insurance industry via the mechanism of risk sharing.
It is important to see this movement towards risk sharing in the
appropriate light. It is yet another example of the interplay between
the use of the market as a means to allocate health care coverage and
the inherent problems with the insurance model of health care cover-
age. The uncertainty inherent in insuring against health expendi-
tures pursuant to established insurance principles causes the indus-
try to undertake risk sharing as a means to avoid that risk. This is
the same phenomenon that accounts for the industry's desire to util-
ize individual risk underwriting and engage in cherry-picking.
The federal government has slowly responded to activities that
result from the flight from health insurance risk by the private in-
surers. The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") limits employ-
ers' ability to discriminate against individuals on the basis of a dis-
ability when designing health benefits under self funded
arrangements."' The ADA also arguably prohibits insurers from en-
gaging in such discrimination in connection with employer's spon-
sored health insurance.17 The federal government has also estab-
lished limited mandated benefit requirements,"' restricted the
914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1996)).
170. See AMA, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(2)(D) (1994). HMOs may make "arrangements with
physicians or other health professionals, health care institutions.., to assume all or
part of the financial risk on a prospective basis for the provision of basic health ser-
vices." Id. Furthermore, federally qualified HMOs dealing with the Medicare program
must have "effective procedures to monitor utilization and to control cost of basic and
supplemental health services and to achieve utilization goals, which may include
mechanisms such as risk sharing, financial incentives, or other provisions agreed to by
providers." 42 C.F.R. §417.103(b) (1999).
172. See Jacobi, supra note 23, at 385. Jacobi notes:
[I]n advancing a "comparative fairness" application of the ADA to health
coverage, the EEOC permits the exclusion or severe limitation of coverage
for the disabled only if actuarially similar conditions are similarly treated.
The effect of this policy will be to reduce risk segmentation. Employers and
plans will find that public opinion bars them from limiting those with "fa-
vored" conditions, such as heart disease or cancer. As a result, they will also
find themselves barred by law from limiting those with "disfavored" condi-
tions such as AIDS.
Id.
173. See id. at 351-52 (noting the ADA prohibits discrimination of fringe benefits
whether administered by the employer or by an entity operating under a contract for
the employer).
174. See supra note 75 and accompanying text for a description of federally-
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application of pre-existing condition limitations,'75 and the use of ge-
netic testing.176 Notwithstanding these efforts, however, self-funding
and risk sharing remain vital avenues by which the private health
insurance industry extricates itself from the business of insuring
against health risk. More importantly, greater intervention by the
federal government in the private sector market for health coverage
is likely to meet the same fate as state level intervention. Faced with
increased federal mandates, employers will be inclined to decrease
the availability of benefit packages they offer. The lesson is simple: a
government cannot prohibit activities that result in externalities
without also addressing the inevitable flight from health insurance
risk that will result from the inability to exploit those externalities.
Curtailing externalities causes insurers to withdraw from the market
for coverage and employers to reduce health benefits offered to em-
ployees.
The flight from insurance risk betrays the limitations of "Patient
Bill of Rights" legislation.7 Democrats have called for greater inter-
mandated minimum inpatient hospital coverage following childbirth delivery.
175. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 101(a) Pub.
L. No. 104-19 1, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939 (1996) (amending ERISA to place limits on impos-
ing pre-existing condition exclusions for all group health plans).
176. See Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act, § 102(a) ("A health plan
or insurer may not establish rules for eligibility based on health status, medical condi-
tion, claims experience, receipt of health care, genetic information, evidence of insur-
ability or disability.").
177. "Patients' Bill of Rights" was a phrase adopted by President Clinton in his 1997
State of the Union Address. See Michael Misocky, The Patients' Bill of Rights: Man-
aged Care Under Siege, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 57, 60 (1998). However,
"Patients' Bill of Rights" (also known as "Patient Protection Act") legislation has been
the subject of much activity at the state level both prior to and subsequent to Presi-
dent Clinton's speech. See, e.g., Georgia: Gov. Miller Signs Four Bills Aimed at Man-
aged Care Enrollees, 5 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 16, 24 (Apr. 18, 1996) (describing Patient
Protection Act of 1996 signed into law by Georgia Governor Zell Miller); Minnesota:
Governor Signs Managed Care Bill, MinnesotaCare Expansion Tobacco Sales, 6 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 24, 19 (June 12, 1997) (describing Patient Protection Act signed into
law by Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson); New Jersey: Sweeping Patient Protection
Act Will Build on Comprehensive HMO Act, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 33, 23 (Aug. 14,
1997) (describing "Patient Protection Bill" signed into law by New Jersey Governor
Christine Whitman); Texas: Governor Bush Signs Legislation Expanding Managed
Care Protections, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP., 27, 29 (July 3, 1997) (describing consumer
protection act signed into law by Texas Governor George W. Bush, Jr.); Hawaii: Gov.
Cayetano Signs Patient Protection Bill with Gag Clause Ban, Grievance Process, 7
BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1163 (July 23, 1998) (describing Patient's Bill of Rights legisla-
tion signed into law by Hawaii governor). Of course, state action in this area may be of
limited utility because of the ERISA preemption doctrine discussed in this article. Un-
der ERISA, a court may find that state "Patients' Bill of Rights," "Patient Protection
Act," and "consumer protection" laws are preempted as relating to an employee benefit
plan and not saved from preemption by the insurance savings clause. See, e.g., Corpo-
rate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 630 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (in-
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vention in the health coverage market by in making managed care
organizations accountable for medical necessity determinations by
allowing lawsuits against them. 8 This provision is required because
validating provisions of Texas Patient Protections Act which (1) established an inde-
pendent review process for review of medical necessity determinations, (2) prohibited
health plan from removing provider for advocating on behalf of the client and (3) pro-
hibited managed care companies from including indemnification clauses on contracts
with providers). This ruling, if followed by other courts, "will have a chilling effect on
patient protection legislation in all the states considering managed care reform."
Brenda T. Strama, Did Court in Texas Split the Baby in HMO Liability Decision, 7
BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1694 (Oct. 22, 1998).
178. See Misocky, supra note 177, at 85 (describing Democratic response to health
care). This liability provision is the most salient of the differences between the Democ-
ratic backed Patient Bill of Rights (S. 1344) and the Republican Bill of Rights Plus Act
(S. 326, S. 300). See Comparison of Major Provisions of Democratic, Republican Pa-
tient's Bill of Rights Legislation, 8 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1145 (July 15, 1999). Accord-
ing to the BNA Health Law Reporter, the differences noted in the two pieces of legisla-
tion were:
Liability. The Democratic bill would allow patients to sue health plans for
damages in state courts for denied or delayed benefits. Employers could be
sued if they were involved in the benefits decision, but would be shielded if
they were not involved. Republicans oppose this.
Medical necessity. Democrats would require health plans to pay for medical
care that the treating physician believes to be "medically necessary." Repub-
licans oppose this.
Scope of coverage. The Democratic bill would cover all 161 million Americans
with private health insurance. The GOP bill would cover only the 48 million
Americans in self-insured health plans, which are beyond the reach of state
regulation, and let the states cover the rest. The exceptions are the external
review and information disclosure provisions, which would apply to the 123
million Americans in self-insured and fully insured plans.
Access. Democrats say the GOP bill does not provide a strong enough guar-
antee of access to specialists and continuity of care, and is missing other pro-
tections like access to clinical trials.
External review. While both bills would provide external appeals of health
plan decisions, Democrats say the Republican bill is too limited because only
disputes over medical necessity or experimental or investigational treat-
ments could be appealed.
Medical savings accounts. The Republican bill would attempt to give patients
a greater choice of health plans by lifting the restrictions on the medical sav-
ings accounts demonstration project. Democrats oppose this.
Id. The BNA Health Law Reporter also notes the areas of agreement between the two
bills:
While there are significant differences in the details, both.., allow patients
to appeal coverage denials to an external review board; guarantee broader
coverage of emergency room services; give patients direct access to special-
ists without going through "gatekeeper" physicians; give women direct access
to obstetrician-gynecologists; provide continuity of care for pregnant women,
patients receiving institutional care, and the terminally ill when their spe-
cialist leaves the network; provide a point-of-service option, allowing patients
in a closed managed care network to pay extra to see providers outside the
network; require health plans to disclose a greater amount of information
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under ERISA's preemption of state laws affecting employee benefit
plans and the self funded environment, there is an absence of legal
liability for improper medical necessity determinations.9 If there is
no consequence for making an improper medical necessity determi-
nation, there is no cost to the decision maker. This is yet another op-
portunity to exploit a negative externality. The measures proposed by
the Democrats would foreclose exploitation of this negative external-
ity. The Republicans have responded to these proposals, arguing they
will drive up the costs of health care and cause employers to drop
benefits coverage. 8 ° The Republican response echos the lesson of the
about what they do and do not cover and what their rules are; and ban so-
called "gag clauses" in managed care contracts.
Id.
179. See Misocky, supra note 177, at 80-81 (noting that many courts interpret
ERISA's broad preemption language to preempt liability suits against ERISA plans).
See id. at 81 n.124 (collecting authority); see also Corcoran v. United HealthCare Inc.,
965 F.2d 1321, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding ERISA preempted wrongful death claim
under circumstances where death to fetus was attributed to managed care entity's re-
fusal to approve inpatient care for pregnant mother against the recommendation of
her treating physician). It appears that this particular liability shield may be yielding
to judicial inclination to entertain lawsuits against ERISA entities as long as the
plaintiffs claim involves the quality of benefits received as opposed to claims based on
a denial of benefits resulting from the benefit determination process. See Corporate
Health Ins. Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d. at 620 (noting claims challenging the quality of a
benefit received are not preempted, but that claims based on a failure to treat are pre-
empted where failure was the result of a determination that the requested treatment
was not covered by the plan) (citing Pacificare, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th
Cir. 1995) (finding that a medical malpractice claim was not preempted by ERISA
when issue of doctor's negligence required assessment of admittedly covered treatment
or giving professional advice)); Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331 (determining that medical
determinations made by an HMO were preempted by ERISA because made in context
of benefits determination under the plan). Of course, the result of this distinction is
that there is no liability for an improper denial of benefits, a point that was poignantly
addressed in Corcoran:
The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans have no
remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake. This is
troubling for several reasons. First, it eliminates an important check on the
thousands of medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization
review system. With liability rules generally inapplicable, there is theoreti-
cally less deterrence of substandard medical decisionmaking. Moreover, if the
cost of compliance with a standard of care... need not be factored into utili-
zation review companies' cost of doing business, bad medical judgments will
end up being cost-free to the plans that rely on these companies to contain
medical costs.
Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338 (emphasis added).
180. See, e.g., Congressional Roundup: Senate Approves GOP Managed Care Reform
Plan; Focus Turns to House, 8 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1189 (July 22, 1999) (quoting
Senate Majority Whip Don Nickles (R.-Okla.)). Senator Nickles, referring to the pas-
sage of the Republican Patient's Bill of Rights Plus Act which does not include liability
for erroneous benefit denial, stated "[w]e wanted to improve the quality of healthcare
without increasing costs or increasing the number of uninsured."
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flight from insurance risk: Curtailing opportunities to exploit exter-
nalities will be met by resistance and reduced or eliminated health
coverage. The problem with the Patient Bill of Rights debate is that
it ignores the problem of externalities. In order to contain extranali-
ties, the government must also prevent a flight from health insur-
ance risk. Such is not possible when infatuation with the market
blinds policy makers to the merits of comprehensive and substantial
intervention by the government in the health coverage market.
V. WATER, WATER EVERYWHERE
There are problems associated with using the insurance model in
the market as the means of allocating health coverage. Markets can-
not effectively allocate health coverage because the market does not
effectively address the problems of externalities. The insurance
model is defective because it depends upon exploitation of external-
ities for its success. The result of the use of the insurance model to
allocate health coverage in the market is fragmented coverage for
some individuals and no coverage for many others. Efforts to inter-
vene in the market in an incremental piecemeal fashion result in a
flight from insurance risk and threatened additional reductions in
the availability of health coverage.
Given the problems inherent with the insurance model combined
with the allocation of health coverage through the market, most
countries have abandoned either the insurance model, reliance on the
market, or both in order to achieve universal health coverage. The
United States alone remains beholden to the twin inadequacies of the
insurance model and the market to allocate protection against health
risks. Countries which have achieved universal health coverage have
used a number of options to achieve this goal: socialized medicine, so-
cialized insurance, or mandatory private insurance. However, one
feature of each of these systems is that ultimately the society pro-
vides some sort of social subsidy for health care.
The inevitable fact of health care is that, if a government fails to
subsidize health care, the citizens will not consume health care at so-
cially optimal levels. Disparities in the health condition, age, and in-
come of the citizens will mean that some individuals will be priced
out of the necessary coverage. With the introduction of the Medicare
and the Medicaid programs, the United States has acknowledged the
need for a subsidy for health care for persons whose condition would
price them out of the market for health coverage.181 Persons who re-
ceive their insurance through their employers benefit from another
social subsidy for health care-the tax deductions offered to employ-
181. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for discussion of role of Medicare and
Medicaid in American health coverage system.
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ers for their expenses for their employees' health care."8 ' Therefore,
even in the United States the inevitability of a need to subsidize
health care is evident, if not fully appreciated. The problem that we
have is the failure to commit to the additional subsidy required to
fully cover the total population.
Some countries have opted for pure socialized medicine. '83 Under
a system of socialized medicine, the government not only pays for
health services but it also owns the means of delivery and employs
the providers.' These systems abandon both the insurance model
and the market and replace them with explicit public subsidies. The
right to health coverage is not based on the ability to pay for insur-
182. See supra note 71 and accompanying text for discussion of tax and deductions
available for health expenses.
183. The term "socialized medicine" has various connotations depending on the
speaker or the listener, and the use of the word is predominately undefined, but fre-
quently pejorative. See, e.g., Julie Marquis & Dave Lesher, California and the West, If
Education is 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, Where's Health Care?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at A3
(quoting Republican state legislator as indicating Republicans' preference for reform-
ing healthcare through the private sector because "[o]therwise we're marching down
the path toward socialized medicine"); see also Senate Cuts Some Slack to Beleaguered
HMO Industry, MEDICINE & HEALTH, July 19, 1999 (quoting Senator Don Nickles as
saying "[1]ook at other countries that have really tried socialized medicine, govern-
ment-controlled medicine, government dictates from A-Z"); Laurie McGinley, In Other
Wards: Republicans Don't Feel Too Good as Doctors Cut Across Party Lines, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 28, 1999, at Al (describing how Senator Edward Kennedy was "[d]emonized
for years by the AMA as a promoter of socialized medicine"); Joseph Lee Pugh, BROKER
WORLD, Sept. 1, 1999 available at 1999 WL 124128 (referring to "socialized medicine"
as "a national health care program run by bureaucrats and worse"). As used in this
article, "socialized medicine" means a health financing and delivery system wherein
the government owns the health care system and the services are financed through the
tax system. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reforming the Health Care System: The Uni-
versal Dilemma, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 21, 22 (1993) (noting that under socialized medi-
cine, "the production of health care is substantially owned by the government"). Sys-
tems wherein the government owns the health care system are also referred to as the
"National Health Service" model. See Saunders, supra note 31, at 722 n.49 (equating
"National Health service model" with "universal coverage, national general tax financ-
ing and national ownership"). Socialized medicine, or the National Health Service
Model, is associated with the "Beveridge Model" of financing through general taxation.
See, e.g., Christopher Newdick, Public Health Ethics and Clinical Freedom, 14 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 335, 362 (1998) ("Under Beveridge model, countries
such as the U.K., Sweden, Norway, Italy, and Spain commit themselves to a system
under which health care is financed by the treasury from general taxation."); see also
Kieke G. H. Okma, European Health Care Reform: Analysis of Current Strategies by
Richard B. Saltman and Joseph Figueras, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 835, 836
(1999) (book review) (describing Beveridge Model as funding through "earmarked gen-
eral taxation"). The Beveridge Model derives its name from William Beveridge, author
of the Beveridge Report of 1942 "on which post-war reform of the British [W]elfare
[S]tate was based." Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Principles and Power in the Health Care
Arena: Reflections on the Canadian Experience, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 205, 207 (1994).
184. See Reinhardt, supra note 183, at 22.
1026 [Vol. 52:987
A MAN ON THE MOON
ance but is rather a form of entitlement attached to citizenship.185
Britain, Italy, Sweden, and Kenya are examples of nations that pro-
vide health coverage through socialized medicine."' 5
Other countries have opted for a system of socialized insur-
ance. i"7 Pursuant to such a system, the government or agencies of the
government provide health coverage for individuals. 8' These systems
also abandon the insurance model and the market and replace them
with explicit public subsidies. Canada, Australia, Norway and New
Zealand are examples of countries that utilize a system of socialized
health insurance.
189
185. See Tuohy, supra note 183, at 206; Saunders, supra note 31, at 723.
186. See WILLIAM C. COCKERHAM, MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 285, 289-91, 311 (7th ed.
1995) (describing the formation of the British National Health Service in 1948 as an
instance of the government "becom[ing] the employer for health workers, main-
tain[ing] facilities, and purchas[ing] supplies and new equipment"; describing Swedish
national health services wherein physicians are employed by county councils and gen-
eral hospitals; describing the Italian National health service, the Servizio Sanitario
Nazionale (SSN), established in 1978; describing Kenyan National Health Service that
employs physicians and owns hospitals); see also Saunders, supra note 31, at 716-17
(describing health system in Denmark which abolished health insurance funds as in-
dependent services organization and provides the total administration by municipal
authorities).
187. "Socialized insurance" is often confused with "socialized medicine." See
Reinhardt, supra note 183, at 23 ("[D]istinction between socialized insurance and so-
cialized medicine is often lost on American critics of foreign health care systems."). As
used in this Article, "socialized insurance" means a system where the government di-
rectly pays physicians and other providers for services rendered to the citizens, but the
physicians and other providers are part of the private sector. This needs to be distin-
guished from programs where the citizens are covered by private or quasi-public insur-
ing entities referred to herein as "mandatory private insurance." See note 190 infra
and accompanying text for description of "mandatory private insurance."
188. See Reinhardt, supra note 183, at 23.
189. See COCKERHAM, supra note 186, at 283 ("Canada essentially has a private
system of health care delivery paid for almost entirely by public money. Private health
insurance is generally prohibited except for covering only some supplemental benefits
such as semiprivate room accommodations."); see also Vibeke Erichsen, Health Care
Reform in Norway: The End of the "Profession State"? 20 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L.
719, 720-21 (1995) (describing Norwegian health care system which provides health
care through a system of public hospitals which employ one-half of the physicians and
a system of state health insurance); Gwen Gray, Access to Medical Care Under Strain:
New Pressures in Canada and Australia, 23 J. HEALTH. POL. POL'Y & L. 905, 925
(1998) (noting Australia introduced its Medicare program in 1984). The Australian
Medicare program is a publicly administered national health insurance program which
provides free hospital service for all Australians, which covers all hospital care. Id.
Hospitals pay physicians for the costs of physician services rendered to hospital in-
patients, therefore, Australians receive no bills for services provided in hospitals. Id.
at 933. Physicians may bill patients for out-patient services for which the public insur-
ance plan will reimburse the patient up to 85% of the national fee schedule amount.
Id. Doctors are allowed to exceed the fee schedule amount, however. Id. There is also a
bulk billing process pursuant to which physicians bill the national health plan instead
of the patients if the physicians agree to make no charges to the patients. Id. 71.8% of
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Finally, some countries utilize a tightly regulated system of
mandatory "private" insurance.19 Such countries maintain the insur-
ance model. However these countries maintain tight governmental
control over the insurance industry."' The control exercised over the
all out-patient doctor bills are billed pursuant to the bulk billing process. Id; see also
Robert H. Blank, Rationing Medicine: A Comparative Analysis, 21 W. ST. U. L. REV.
11, 20-23 (1993) (describing the health system of New Zealand). In New Zealand,
health care is financed through the tax system. Id. at 22. "Four Regional Health Au-
thorities... [are] responsible for purchasing health care for their populations." Id.
190. Mandatory "private" insurance as used herein combines compulsory universal
coverage financed by employer, individual, and governmental contributions to private
or quasi-public insurance entities. This arrangement is sometimes referred to as the
"Social Insurance model." See Saunders, supra note 31, at 722 n.49.; see also GLASER,
supra note 56, at 4 ("Social insurance funds are based on an obligatory membership by
entire social classes."). This system is also referred to as the "Bismarck model." See,
e.g., Newdick, supra note 183, at 362 ("In Bismarck systems ... health care is financed
through compulsory social insurance in which entitlements to care are based on stan-
dards and criteria agreed between the insurance providers and the government."); see
also Dana Derham-Aoyama, U.S. Health Care Reform: Some Lessons From Japanese
Health Care Law and Practice, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 365, 374 (1995) (noting
that Japan followed the Bismarck model by "form[ing] 'mutual aid' trade associations
to finance health care for some Japanese workers"); Okma, supra note 183, at 836 (re-
ferring to social health insurance as the Bismarck model). The Bismarck model derives
its name from Chancellor Otto Van Bismarck who pioneered the system in 19th cen-
tury Germany. See Derham-Aoyama, supra, at 373 n.94.
191. See, e.g., Done, supra note 23, at 748-49 ("German laws mandate that all per-
sons participate in the sickness funds, and that sickness funds provide comprehensive
benefits to all members for the same premium regardless of health, age, or economic
status."); see also Blank, supra note 189, at 27. In Japan, "[a]lthough the health care
delivery system is dominated by the private sector, unlike the U.S. it is not market-
oriented. While providers compete for patients and consumers have broad freedom of
choice, all funders and providers are strictly regulated by the government." Id.; see
also David Chinitz, Israel's Health Policy Breakthrough: The Politics of Reform and the
Reform of Politics, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 909, 917 (1995) (noting that under
reforms in Israeli health system, health insurers are not "allowed to practice biased
selection, exclude persons with pre-existing conditions, or place any conditions or re-
strictions on membership"). In addition, the health insurers would need to provide a
uniform "basic benefits package." Id. at 916; see also Richard B. Saltman and Joseph
Figueras, Analyzing the Evidence on European Health Care Reforms, HEALTH AFF. 85,
93 (1998) ("Countries with Bismarck-style funding systems (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland) typically have long-established, statutory
insurance-based systems.... Nearly all are subject to close regulation by government,
which has been growing, on grounds either of cost containment (by, for instance, put-
ting a ceiling on premiums) or of equity and solidarity."); Victor G. Rodwin & Simone
Sandier, Health Care Under French National Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF. 111 (Fall
1993) (describing the French health system). As noted by Rodwin and Sandier:
[T]he French active population is covered by statutory, occupation-based, na-
tional health insurance schemes that are part of the social security system.
All dependents are automatically covered, as are the unemployed and the re-
tired. National health insurance funds are organized into regional and local
funds, all of which are, in French administrative law, private organizations
charged with the provision of public service. However,... the funds are
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industry curtails the influence of the market on insurers' behavior.
The government prohibits the insurers from denying coverage to any
eligible individual, establishes the premiums insurers can charge,
prescribes the benefits they must cover and prohibits individual risk
underwriting.9 2 Therefore, although such systems may rely on the
insurance model to provide health coverage, they do not rely on the
unfettered action of the market to provide such coverage. Examples
of systems that utilize a system of tightly regulated mandatory pri-
vate health insurance are Germany, Switzerland, Japan, the Nether-
lands, France, and Belgium.'93
closely supervised by the Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the Ministry of
Finance and are therefore, in practice, quasi-public organizations. Health in-
surance premiums (payroll tax rates) are set by the government, as are the
range of benefits, which are, with minor exceptions, uniform across national
health insurance schemes. In addition, the central government oversees a
process of national negotiations between the three principal national health
insurance funds and representatives of health care providers. It thereby as-
sures that all providers are subject to uniform reimbursement policies irre-
spective of the schemes under which patients are covered.
Id. at 116.
192. See Rodwin & Sandier, supra note 191, at 116-17.
193. See COCKERHAM, supra note 186, at 294 (noting that in Japan not all Japanese
are covered by the national health insurance plan and that virtually all Japanese are
covered by some form of health insurance, which is provided by large employers, small
and medium sized employers, and public and quasi-public institutions). Germany has
utilized a health system which is dependent on compulsory insurance since 1883. Id.
at 296. Under the German system, all employees, self-employed, unemployed, old-age
pensioners and certain categories of domestic workers are required to belong to one of
the 1317 public health insurance groups. Id. Ten percent of the population, consisting
of civil servants, the self-employed and white-collar workers with annual income
"above the governmental ceiling," may opt for private insurance. Id. at 297, 299 (de-
scribing the health system in the Netherlands pursuant to which 68% of the popula-
tion is enrolled in public insurance funds and 32%, consisting of civil servants, the self-
employed, and people with the highest income, maintain private insurance). "[T]here
is no single organization providing health insurance on a nationwide basis. Rather, the
French insurance system is divided between occupational groups. Professionals, busi-
nessmen, craftsmen, civil servants, farmers, and other occupations have their own or-
ganizations." Id. at 300. The insurance organizations in France are nonprofit and are
supervised by a government agency. Id. at 301; see also Chinitz, supra note 191, at 909
(describing Israeli health system). Up until the 1990s, Israel had relied on voluntary
health coverage through four sickness funds pursuant to which 96% of the population
was covered by health insurance. Id. at 911-12. During the 1990s, however, the gov-
ernment instituted a series of reforms which would (1) maintain "[c]ompetition among
regional, decentralized sickness funds"; but (2) "[c]entraliz[e] collection of health sys-
tem revenues and risk-based capitation"; (3) provide for a "standard, minimum bene-
fits package"; and (4) prohibit selective enrollment by the sickness funds by providing
for "[ulniversal access and open enrollment." Id. at 916; see also Patrice R. Wolfe &
Donald W. Moran, Global Budgeting in the OECD Countries, 14 HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REVIEW 55, 67 (1993) ("Belgium has a compulsory health insurance system
that provides coverage to the entire population. The system is administered by one
public fund and five mutualities and is funded by both social security contributions
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Pursuant to these strategies that abandon the insurance model
for a form of social entitlement or which abandon reliance on the
market, nearly all of these countries have achieved universal cover-
age for their citizens."' Their citizens generally are allowed to pick
their own physicians,19 and they appear to be generally more satis-
fied with their health system than people in the United States.196
The price for this universal coverage is a public subsidy provided
for health care which is an integral part of the health financing ar-
rangements. In this connection, subsidy is narrowly defined as addi-
tional dollars used to cover an individual's health care needs that are
not attributable to the collection of money paid by such individual. In
countries with socialized medicine or socialized insurance, the sub-
sidy is approximately 100% because there are no insurance premi-
ums. In countries with mandatory private or quasi private insurance,
a subsidy might take the form of a direct payment from the govern-
ment to an insurance fund in order to adjust for the risk assumed by
that insurance fund. 97 Sometimes the subsidy is provided by other
insurance funds through a system of cross subsidization.' The idea
and State subsidies.").
194. As of 1994, the United States and South Africa were the only two
industrialized nations which do not guarantee access to health care for all of their
citizens. See Angelo A. Stio III, State Government: The Laboratory for National Health
Care Reform, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 322, 326 (1994). However, the post-apartheid
South African Constitution provides for universal access to health care. See South
Africa's Largest Health Plan Administrator Taps Health Systems Design in Drive to
Managed Care, BUS. WIRE, July 23, 1996 (noting also that only a small percentage of
citizens had health insurance). Like the United States, South Africa relied heavily on
self-insured employers to provide health coverage. Id.; see also Karen Davis, In-
ternational Health Policy: Common Problems, Alternatives Strategies, 18 HEALTH AFF.
135 (May 1, 1999) ("The United States is the only major industrialized nation that
does not provide universal health insurance coverage.").
195. See, e.g., Done, supra note 23, at 748 (noting "[v]irtually all German citizens
are covered by health insurance, [and] have free choice of physicians"); see also Rodwin
& Sandier, supra note 191, at 117 ("In France there are no restrictions on provider
choice-no preferred provider organizations (PPOs) .... no gatekeeper functions for
primary care physicians.").
196. See, e.g., COCKERHAM, supra note 186, at 284 ("Surveys consistently report that
Canadians prefer their healthcare system-especially in contrast to the American
model."); see also Robert J. Blendon & Humphrey Taylor DataWatch: Views on Health
Care: Public Opinion in Three Nations, HEALTH AFF. 149, 151 (Spring 1989) ("Of the
three nations surveyed, [Canada, U.S., Great Britain] Americans express the greatest
degree of dissatisfaction with their health care system.").
197. See, e.g., Done, supra note 23, at 751 (noting that German sick funds with "a
disproportionate number of retired members" will receive additional compensation
from a national fund).
198. See, e.g., Aki Yoshikawa et al., How Does Japan Do It? Doctors and Hospitals
in a Universal Health Care System, 3 STAN. L. & POLlY REV. 111, 117 (1991) (describ-
ing system of cross-subsidization between insurance groups in Japan); see also Rodwin
& Sandier, supra note 191, at 117 ( noting that in France, "[simaller funds with older,
1030 [Vol. 52:987
A MAN ON THE MOON
is that some form of public subsidy is required to finance adequate
health coverage. The subsidy has two major effects: (1) it induces
consumption of health care to levels which exceed non-subsidized
levels and (2) helps to socialize risk across larger segments of the
population.
VI. THE COST CONTAINMENT CONUNDRUM
As described above, countries with universal health coverage
achieve such coverage through explicit public subsidies. However, a
government may also encourage private conduct by permitting pri-
vate parties to exploit externalities associated with such conduct.199
Health coverage in the United States appears to be uniquely depend-
ent on the ability of employers and insurers to exploit externalities
associated with their decisions regarding financing health coverage.
As described above, in the United States any governmental action to
curtail exploitation of externalities is met with a threatened or po-
tential flight from health insurance risk. Thus, governmental policies
which allow private parties to exploit externalities are justified be-
cause they keep the cost of health care down and thereby increase ac-
cess to health care. Unfortunately, "playing the Market" in this fash-
ion not only undermines universal health coverage, but also yields
ineffective cost containment.
All countries have had to deal with the specter of increasing
health care costs."' Despite their increased access to health care,
countries with universal coverage spend less of their GNP on health
care than the United States, notwithstanding the explicit social sub-
sidy provided for health care in such countries."' The United States
higher-risk populations are subsidized by CNAMTS [one of the larger insurance funds]
as well as by the government").
199. See, e.g., Colin Crawford, Some Thoughts on the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Political Stability and Environment Equity, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 585, 616
(1995) (discussing OECD's "polluter pays" principle as a mechanism to "eliminate what
might be viewed as hidden subsidies in the form of clean up costs that would otherwise
be borne directly by the government or subsequent property owners"); see also Peter J.
Hammer, Free Speech and the "Acid Bath": An Evaluation and Critique of Judge Rich-
ard Posner's Economic Interpretation of the First Amendment, 87 MICH. L. REV. 499,
527 (1988) ("Inaction in the face of external costs ... has the same effect as providing a
subsidy for the activity causing the harm.").
200. David Wilsford, States Facing Interests: Struggles over Health Care Policy in
Advanced, Industrial Democracies, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 571, 573 (1995)
("[E]very health system of the developed world faces severe cost problems. The entire
postwar period is characterized by an increasingly large share of GDP needed to pay
for health care every year in every country.").
201. See Saunders, supra note 31, at 733 ("Under the current health care system in
the United States, health care expenditure is the highest in the world."). "As a percent
of GNP in U.S. dollars, the United States leads the world in cost of health care at
11.2% versus 6% in Denmark (the lowest percent). Id. n.86. "In 1990, per-person
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also does far worse in controlling health care inflation than other
countries. 22 This may be attributable in part to how the systems ap-
proach physician compensation.
All health care systems must deal with the impact of physician
decision making on the volume and kinds of health expenditures. 20 3 It
is paradigmatic that, if left unchecked, physician decision making
could bankrupt the economies of all nations. This is not because of
any greed attributable to physicians. It is because of the simple fact
that the costs of medically feasible services far exceed the GNP of
any economy.0 4 The manner by which the health care system com-
pensates physicians influences the volume and type of services pro-
vided and ordered by physicians for their patients. Capitation
arrangements lead to lower utilization. ' 5  Fee withholding is
associated with lower rates of admissions to hospitals or referrals
health care costs in the United States were more than double the OECD average." Id.;
see also George Schieber, Health Spending Delivery, and Outcomes in OECD Countries
Data Watch, HEALTH AFF. 120, 120-21, 125 (1993). In 1991, as a percentage of gross
domestic product, the United States spent 13.2%. Canada spent 10% and no other
OECD country spent over 10%. Id. The average percentage for OECD countries was
7.9%. See id. at 121. Spending per capita in the U.S. was $2868 compared to OECD
average of $1305. Id.
202. See Schieber, supra note 201, at 125 ("Excess health care inflation is a far more
serious problem in the United States than in other countries .... [B]etween 1985 and
1991 U.S. Nominal per capita health spending each year increased 70% faster than
nominal per capita. GDP ... compared with only 35% in Canada, 19% in France, 13%
in the United Kingdom and 10% in Japan. Nominal per capita health spending in-
creased 12% less rapidly than nominal per capita GDP in Germany.").
203. See JOHN M. EISENBERG, M.D., DOCTORS' DECISIONS AND THE COST OF
MEDICAL CARE 3 (1986) ("Although physicians' fees represent only about 20 percent of
health care costs, as much as 80 percent of expenditures for medical care are for ser-
vices prescribed by physicians."). Dr. Eisenberg notes:
Physicians serve a dual role in the provision of personal health services. Like
the player-manager of an athletic team, the physician is responsible for call-
ing the plays in medical care as well as working with others to carry them
out. In the parlance of economics, this dual role means that the physician in-
fluences the cost and quality of medical care in two ways: first, by organizing
and directing the production process; and second, by providing some of the
productive input.
Id.
204. Elhauge, supra note 54, at 1459 ("Most knowledgeable observers believe we
could today easily spend 100% of our GNP on health care without running out of ser-
vices that would provide some positive health benefit to some patient."); see id. at 1458
n.15 (collecting authority).
205. PAULY, supra note 133, at 102 ("Under both salary and capitation, if physi-
cians provide more services, they simply work harder with no additional income; these
methods would thus be expected to exert more control over the volume of services de-
livered than would fee-for-service."); see also COCKERHAM, supra note 186, at 287 (not-
ing that the capitation system under the British system gave rise to a "serious concern
and some evidence that medical care was being provided in quantity rather than qual-
ity"). A payer may decide to implement a capitation arrangement with an individual
physician or with a group of physicians. Under either system, the incentive created
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with lower rates of admissions to hospitals or referrals specialists. °6
Fee-for-service has been associated with excess utilization.0 7
Given the association between physician compensation and the
volume and kinds of health services, altering physician compensation
has been an important strategy in the cost containment effort in the
United States.2"8 As indicated above, under managed care, physicians
in the United States have been moved toward more risk sharing ar-
rangements and less fee-for-service arrangements. These arrange-
ments attempt to hold down health care costs by placing physicians
at financial risk for some portion of the medical expenses that their
patients incur as a result of the physicians' decision making.
On the surface it appears that financial risk sharing has con-
tributed to slowing the growth of health care expenditures in the
United States."9 However, these savings have been achieved at the
and the physician's reaction to it is dependent on the comprehensiveness of the capita-
tion payment. See PAULY, supra note 133, at 102. If the capitation payment is designed
to cover only physician services, the physician's response to the capitation arrange-
ment is to increase patients assigned to the physician but reduce the amount of the
physician's time spent per patient. See id. If the capitation payment covers services in
addition to the physician's services, the physician's response would be to decrease
utilization of such services. Id.
206. Allison Faber Walsh, Comment, The Legal Attack on Cost Containment
Mechanisms: The Expansion of Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organiza-
tions, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 219 (1997) (noting use of "risk pools, bonuses and
expanded capitation to decrease a primary care physician's use of referrals, diagnostic
tests and other services"). A fee withhold can also apply to an individual physician or
to a group of physicians. Id. at 218-21. When applied to an individual physician, this
supplies a direct incentive to the physician to approach the utilization of care covered
by the withhold with a degree of conservatism. Id. Under a pooled withhold, a group of
physicians' fees are placed at risk for services not provided by physicians. Id. at 219-
20. If the pooled group has some ability to control the members of the group, there will
be an incentive to approach utilization of services covered by the withhold with a de-
gree of conservatism. If the pooled group has no way of controlling members of the
group, the incentive is arguably neutral with respect to the withhold. No individual
physician member of the pool has any incentive to reduce utilization of the at-risk ser-
vices in light of the withhold, because they cannot control the conduct of other mem-
bers of the group.
207. See supra note 193 and accompanying text for the connection between fee-for-
service compensation and utilization.
208. See supra notes 117-51 and accompanying text for the role of financial risk
sharing in cost containment effort.
209. See Fred J. Hellinger, The Effect of Managed Care on Quality: A Review of Re-
cent Evidence, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 833, 833-34 (1998) (noting increase in
managed care enrollment between 1988 and 1998 and the fact that the annual rate of
increase in health plan premiums exceeded 17% between 1987 to 1990, but that the
rate fell to a 2% annual increase between 1994 and 1996); see also PAULY, supra note
133, at 111 (citing a RAND Corporation study which indicated that plans which util-
ized capitation payments had 28% less expenditures than fee-for-service health plans);
Christine Gorman, Playing the HMO Game Denied Viagra and Inflamed by Horror
Stories, Consumers Put Health Reform Back on the Front Burner, TIME, July 13, 1998,
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cost of ever increasing dissatisfaction with our health care system,
disruption of the patient physician relationship, and increased levels
of distrust.1 ' It is also apparent that the cost saving may only be
temporary as insurers announce the imminence of increases in
health insurance premiums within the next couple of years.21'
In contrast to the prevalence of financial risk sharing in the
United States, financial risk sharing is virtually absent in foreign
countries in which the government explicitly subsidizes health care.
Because such governments have supplanted or controlled the market
for health coverage they are able to adopt explicit and direct cost con-
tainment measures. They do not need to induce private sector insur-
ers into providing coverage by offering them opportunities to exploit
externalities. More importantly, the governments do not need to
worry about a flight from insurance risk. Thus, these systems had a
motivation to explore financial risk sharing. Although some physi-
cians are compensated on a capitated basis like physicians in HMOs
in the United States,"2 there are no situations outside the United
States where physicians are put at financial risk for services that
they themselves do not provide.
Most of the countries that have universal health care continue to
at 62 (noting that managed care saved between $150 billion and $250 billion in 1997);
Larry J. Pittman, "Any Willing Provider" Laws and ERISA's Saving Clause: A New
Solution for an Old Problem, 64 TENN. L. REV. 409, 415 n.23 (1996) (citing KPMG Peat
Marwick study which found that in areas with high concentration of managed care,
hospitals costs were 11% lower than the national average).
210. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for discussion on rising dissatisfac-
tion with managed care.
211. HMO Premium Hikes Likely Next Year, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at 1999
WL 28125567 (Oct. 6, 1999) ("HMO consumers next year can expect premiums to in-
crease by an average 11 percent, up from an 8 percent hike this year, according to a
survey of health plans .. "); see also Stephanie A. Forest, No More False Alarms:
HMO Rates Are Really Rising, BUS. WK., Sept. 27, 1999, at 52 (noting that HMOs were
locking in contracts for 2000 which have premium increases of as much as 15% of six
times the general inflation rate).
212. See COCKERHAM, supra note 186, at 286 ("[British] [gleneral practitioners are
paid an annual capitation fee for each patient on their patient list as part of a contrac-
tual arrangement with the National Health Service."). In Italy, general practitioners
receive capitation. See id. at 291. In the Netherlands, general practitioners receive
capitation payments from public insurers. See id. at 300; see also Blank, supra note
189, at 18 (noting that Ireland moved to payment of general practitioners on the basis
of capitation). "[T]ax funded health care systems tend to employ primary care practi-
tioners directly and pay them a salary. However, PCPs in Denmark, Norway, Italy,
and the United Kingdom are self-employed and paid by capitation or by a mix of sal-
ary, capitation, and fee-for-service." Id. "Nearly all western European countries had
put in place some form of publicly accountable payers for all of nearly all of their citi-
zens prior to the current reform period, and all remain committed to universal access
and sustainable financing. Despite occasionally heated debates, none has shifted from
publicly to privately accountable funding." Id. at 101.
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compensate physicians on a fee-for-service basis, a compensation
method which is associated with excess utilization or on a salary ba-
sis. 1' The fee schedules, however, differ from fee schedules estab-
lished in the United States health care market. The payers of health
services (some branch of the government or a quasi-governmental
body) negotiate the fee schedules with a collective organized medical
organization which represents all of the physicians in the jurisdic-
tion. 14 Some countries combine this negotiated fee schedule with a
213. See COCKERHAM, supra note 186, at 283 ("[P]hysicians in Canada are generally
private, self-employed, fee-for-service practitioners."). In Sweden, physicians are paid
by the hour and obligated to work a fixed number of hours per week. Id. at 290. In It-
aly, specialists receive salaries or fee for service. Id. at 291. In Japan, physicians in
private practice (about one third) are compensated on a fee-for-service basis and the
rest are salaried employees of hospitals. See id. at 293. In Germany, payment is based
on a fee schedule agreed upon by a doctor's association and a public health insurance
plan. Id. at 298. In the Netherlands, general practitioners receive fee-for-service com-
pensation from private insurers and specialists receive fee-for-service compensation
from private or public insurers. Id. at 300; see also Saltman & Figueras, supra note
191, at 95 ("In insurance-based countries, primary care practitioners are usually inde-
pendent contractors, mainly paid by fee-for-service tied to a negotiated schedule, often
with some form of earnings ceiling."); Rodwin & Sandier, supra note 191, at 118
("French physicians and other health professions in private practice are paid directly
by patients on a fee-for-service-basis."). "All physicians in public hospitals are compen-
sated on the basis of salary payment and sessional fees." Id. at 119.
214. See COCKERHAM, supra note 186, at 283 (noting that Canadian physician fee
schedule is negotiated between the provincial government and medical association). In
Japan, fees are negotiated by an organization comprised of representatives of health
care providers, insurers, management, labor, the public and governmental officials. Id.
at 294; see also Done, supra note 23, at 752-53 (describing Germany's system wherein
physicians are compensated pursuant to a national relative value scale which "is nego-
tiated at the national level between the national association of sickness funds and the
national medical association"); Blank, supra note 189, at 28 (noting that in Japan,
"[p]roviders are paid on a fee-for-service basis with the price of each service deter-
mined by a uniform point fee system. The government's Central Social Medical Care
Council negotiates changes in the fee schedule with representatives of providers, pay-
ers and public interest groups"); Rodwin & Sandier, supra note 191, at 118 ("Charges
for services provided by health professionals-whether in office-based private practice,
in outpatient services of public hospitals, or in private hospitals-are negotiated every
year within the framework of national agreements concluded between representatives
of the health professions and three principal health insurance funds. These agree-
ments establish the terms of payment according to a fee schedule. The process of up-
dating the relative value scale (RVS) to account for new procedures, changing tech-
nologies, and their effects on the costs of production is also the result of negotiations
among the health professions, the national health insurance funds, and the govern-
ment .... Once negotiated, the charges must be respected by all physicians, except for
the one-third (sector 2 physicians) who either have chosen or have earned the right to
engage in extra billing."); Wolfe & Moran, supra note 193, at 72 (describing establish-
ment of fees in the Netherlands). In the Netherlands, "[p]hysician fee levels and capi-
tation rates are set by negotiations between physician associations, the sickness funds,
and private insurers. All negotiations take place under the scrutiny of a quasi-
governmental body .. " Id. "Specialists... set their own fees," however, "[elach spe-
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national or regional budget which sets an overall cap on expenditures
for physician services. 2" The government does not arbitrarily deter-
mine the cap, but establishes it in the light of historical cost data and
political reality. 16 The penalty suffered by the physicians if they ex-
ceed the cap is a further reduction in next year's national fee sched-
ule.217 The fortunes of all of the physicians in the nation depend on
cialist's billings are totaled at the end of the year and compared with the negotiated
norm income. Specialists exceeding the norm must pay back one-third of the first
$15,000 excess, and two-thirds of any income above that level." Id.
215. The cap is a necessary response to the fact that, arguably, when faced with a
discounted compensation arrangement, physicians will attempt to make up for the re-
sulting lost fees by increasing the volume of services provided to patients. To counter
this behavior the government sets an overall cap on expenditures. See, e.g., Done, su-
pra note 23, at 754. According to Done, in Germany, the negotiation process between
the regional associations and the medical associations results in "a fixed budget for all
physician payments in a region." Id. at 753. Although the national organizations nego-
tiate a relative value scale, the regional organizations negotiate the monetary value of
a RVS point. Id.
Physicians are paid on the basis of the negotiated fee schedule and fixed
budget. A physician's revenue (R) is a function of the number of services (S)
rendered, the average number of points (P) for those services, and monetary
value (V) of one point: R=SPV. V is derived from the fixed budget (B) and the
sum of all points billed by all physicians in a certain region: V=BEP. Accord-
ing to these formulas, if the physicians in a region provide more services
than expected, the amount'of money assigned each point value will decrease.
If they provide less services than expected, point value (V) will increase.
Thus, the fixed budget acts as a cap on total physicians' fees.
Id. at 753-54 (citations omitted); see also Wolfe & Moran, supra note 193, at 55 (de-
scribing use of global budgets and expenditure caps in Canada, France, Sweden, Ger-
many, Switzerland, Italy, Norway, and United Kingdom); Blank supra note 189, at 28
(noting the importance of Japan's universal fee schedule in setting allocation priorities
based on the ability to pay for desirable services at higher than the actual cost and un-
desirable services at less than the actual cost).
216. See e.g., PAULY, supra note 133, at 120 (noting that in Canada, excess spending
is recouped through reductions in unit prices in either the current or next year, and in
Germany, per unit prices are determined retrospectively to account for volume in the
current year); Wolfe & Moran, supra note 193, at 66 (noting that a "common outcome
of budget overruns is a reduction in the rate of budget increase for the following year").
"If physicians exceed predetermined levels of utilization, the provinces may do the fol-
lowing: [a]djust the next year's fee increase downward accordingly; ... [florce physi-
cians to work at temporarily reduced fees for a set period of time; ... [p]ay current fees
at a discounted rate to counteract the anticipated size of the utilization increase for
the year." Id. at 68-69.
217. See PAULY, supra note 133, at 121 ("Determining the optimal level of health
spending is ordinarily a policy or political decision .... In Germany .... the target for
any one year is based on the previous year's expenditures, increased by the rate of
growth in the wage rates received by the members of the sickness fund."); see also
Wolfe & Moran, supra note 193, at 68 ("Physician expenditures are controlled in a
number of different ways in Canada ... in [some provinces], levels of utilization are
set that are usually based on the previous year's levels, with some adjustment for fac-
tors such as changes in population, the volume of practicing physicians, and new tech-
nology.").
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their aggregate performance. If physicians perform inefficiently as a
group, the group suffers. Therefore, physicians have an incentive to
police each other in their exercise of individual professional judg-
ment."8 Researchers have determined that fee targets are effective
mechanisms for controlling the costs of medical services.2 9
On the surface, it may appear that expenditure caps should be
subject to the same criticism as the financial risk sharing that is
prevalent in the United States." Each attempts to influence physi-
cian behavior by use of financial inducements. Each may be accused
of fostering a conflict of interest between physicians and their pa-
tients. Notwithstanding this surface similarity, there are however,
significant differences between the two approaches.
First, fee caps result from a highly visible process of negotiation.
Under the private system, the financial risk borne by physicians re-
sults from secret bargaining. Under the public system, there is open
access to the data that informs the negotiation process. Hence, there
is less chance that the caps are based on flawed data or erroneous as-
sumptions. Under the private system, this data is proprietary and
secret, and more subject to abuse and misuse. Under the public sys-
tem, the physicians negotiate with the payer collectively. As such,
there is less of a chance that the cap is the result of unequal bargain-
ing power. Under the private system, physicians negotiate individu-
ally or in groups which must compete with other groups. The bar-
gaining power is diffused and there is a greater chance that the risk
sharing arrangement is the product of unequal bargaining power.
Therefore, although there may be some surface similarity be-
tween the two systems of cost containment, public systems of cost
containment are less subject to the exploitation of externalities that
the private systems appears to depend upon for its viability.
A nation's cost containment policy resolves the "perennial eco-
218. See, e.g., Done, supra note 23, at 754 (Regional medical associations in Ger-
many review physician services retrospectively for over treatment abuse. "Physicians
whose practice patterns deviate from the norm ... are contacted every year to discuss
their practices with the medical associations 'Economic Review' committee ....
[R]epeat offenders.., are denied claim payments and have their practice patterns
publicized.").
219. See id. at 754 (noting the U.S. General Accounting Office findings that Ger-
many's use of RVS and caps on physician services reduced physicians fees by at least
17% between 1977 and 1987).
220. In fact, the capped expenditure arrangements appear a lot like situations in
the United States when an HMO contracts with a medical group or IPA pursuant to a
global capitation or percent of premium arrangement. Under such a system, the physi-
cian's financial destinies are intertwined, as is the case under an expenditure cap. If
the physician group has power to control physician decision making, it will attempt to
do so in order to keep costs within the budget available. This sounds a lot like what
happens in countries where physicians are subject to a cap on physician expenditures.
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nomic conflict""22 between the desire to receive all medically neces-
sary services and the providers' desire for "a healthy slice of the gross
national product."222 When the resolution of that conflict is left to pri-
vate parties dependent on exploitation of externalities, the result is
ineffective cost containment, as well as sub-optimal health coverage.
In other words, reduced coverage for increased payments. This is yet
another byproduct of blind infatuation with markets.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States health care system is a tragic product of our
national infatuation with the Mythology that the market will always
do a more efficient job of allocating resources than the government.
This infatuation has caused us to inappropriately assign to the mar-
ket an endeavor which is more appropriate for the government-the
provision of health coverage. Given the significant externalities in-
herent in the private insurance model, attempting to provide health
coverage through this model in the market results in inadequate
health coverage and ineffective cost containment. It is simply "Bad
Business" to attempt to provide health coverage pursuant to the pri-
vate insurance model through market mechanisms. Our infatuation
with the Mythology has locked us into somewhat of a Faustian bar-
gain. To the extent that we collectively seek to curtail their exploita-
tion of externalities in the health system, insurers and employers en-
gage in or threaten a flight from health insurance which threatens to
leave even fewer people protected by health coverage. In effect, our
health policy is being held hostage by our blind distrust of govern-
ment and our unquestioning faith in markets.
221. Reinhardt, supra note 183, at 21.
222. Id.
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